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ABSTRACT 
RICKY W. LAW: Portraying Predestined Partners? 
German-Japanese Mutual Press Depictions, 1919-1933 
(Under the direction of Christopher R. Browning and W. Miles Fletcher) 
 
Traditionally scholars tried to explain the formation of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis using 
structural factors derived from the totalitarian, Marxist and latecomer theories. While these 
frameworks pinpoint the similarities between Japan and Germany, they do not shed light on 
the timing of the alliance and downplayed potential obstacles such as Nazi racism against 
non-Aryans, Japanese nationalistic anti-Western rhetoric, and the two countries’ conflicting 
economic interests. 
 In view of the shortcomings of the previous approaches, this essay examines interwar 
Japanese and German newspapers to gauge how the two countries portrayed each other. 
Evidence strongly indicates that while Germany and Japan exhibited interests in the other’s 
culture, society and economy, they did not depict each other as a predestined ally but merely 
saw it as one nation among many and even frequently attacked its policies. These findings 
suggest that contingent, not structural, causes led to Japanese-German rapprochement. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
While historians today see the Manchurian Incident and the Reichstag Fire as 
milestones on Japan’s and Germany’s paths to militarism and totalitarianism, allegations and 
conspiracy theories obscured the truth from contemporaries. Hitler’s regime blamed the 
communists for arson and the Kwantung Army accused the Chinese of sabotage. Yet distant 
observers managed to dissect these developments with literally black-and-white clarity. Even 
before the ruins of the Reichstag stopped smoldering a cartoon appeared in a Japanese 
newspaper to expose the culprit behind the blaze. In the illustration Hitler, personifying the 
German government, sets on fire the 
buttocks of a man representing the 
Communist Party and clobbers him 
with a mace labeled “repression” as 
the communist torches the parliament 
(Figure 1).1 The size and centrality of 
Hitler’s flame and the caption “Who 
lit the fire? The communist party’s 
butt is set ablaze” suggest that the 
cartoonist considered the regime 
 
1 Caption reads ??????????????????, in Ikeda Eiji ?????, “Hi o tsuketa no 
wa dare da?” ?????????? (Who lit the fire?), Yomiuri Shinbun ????, 1 March 1933. 
Hereafter Yomiuri. Japanese names are rendered in the family name-given name format. 
2responsible for the fire and the communists as merely reacting in desperation. At around the 
same time, as Japanese troops conquered all Chinese territories north of the Great Wall, a 
German newspaper carried a drawing to shed light on the true nature of Japanese military 
actions in China. Concisely titled “Japan,” the cartoon depicted a smirking Japanese general 
commenting against a backdrop of warplanes, soldiers, explosions and deaths, “We 
emphatically state that we are not waging any war” (Figure 2).2 The artist’s intention to 
highlight Japanese aggressiveness and insincerity emerged poignantly from a contrast of the 
background of destruction and the general’s nonchalant denial. 
While these cartoonists 
should impress us with their 
penetrating insight into news-making 
events half a world away, we should 
also note the papers’ disapproval of 
the other country’s actions. Despite 
Tokyo’s suppression of domestic 
communism the Japanese paper 
sympathized with German 
communists as victims of Nazi 
brutality and painted Hitler as violent and manipulative. Meanwhile the German sheet 
portrayed a deceitful and aggressive Japan desperately spinning a fiction to conceal its 
bloody war in China. From these negative mutual depictions Japanese and German 
 
2 Caption reads „Wir bemerken ausdrücklich, daß wir keinen Krieg führen,“ in “Japan,” Vorwärts: 
Berliner Volksblatt, Zentralorgan der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 12 January 1933. Hereafter V. 
3newspaper readers could hardly have imagined that in less than a decade their countries 
would become comrades in arms in a war for world domination. 
These readers would find scholarly depictions of their countries as some structurally 
predetermined allies equally perplexing. The totalitarian school reasons that Germany and 
Japan followed an authoritarian or even fascist tradition that facilitated ideological 
resonance.3 Marxist historians meanwhile argue that rabid anticommunism and thirst for 
markets and resources drew these two advanced capitalist states to join forces in an 
imperialistic war.4 Lastly, proponents of the latecomer theory connect Germany’s and 
Japan’s relatively tardy formation of the industrialized nation-state, underdeveloped 
democratic middle class and self-imposed urge to catch up with the old colonial empires. As 
the theory has it, these commonalities tied the two “have-not” nations together to challenge 
the status quo by unseating the satiated imperialist powers.5
While these comparative frameworks pinpoint the two countries’ similarities and 
parallel trajectories, they do not adequately explain convergence and its timing, let alone the 
 
3 For totalitarianism’s influence in works on Japanese-German collaboration, see Frank Iklé’s German-
Japanese Relations, 1936-1940: A Study of Totalitarian Diplomacy (New York: Bookman Associates, 1956) 
and Ernst Presseisen’s Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941 (The Hague: M. 
Nijhoff, 1958). Despite the two books’ narrow emphasis on diplomatic and military factors they remain the 
definitive histories of interwar German-Japanese cooperation, with the former approaching from the Japanese 
side and the latter from the German one. Also approaching from the German side, John Fox examines the role 
of the German Foreign Office in advocating Japanese-German rapprochement. See his Germany and the Far 
Eastern Crisis, 1931-1938: A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
 
4 See for example Karl Drechsler, Das Bündnis der Rivalen: Neue Dokumente zur Ost- und 
Südostasienpolitik des faschistischen deutschen Imperialismus im Zweiten Weltkrieg ([East] Berlin: Deutscher 
Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1964). 
 
5 The earliest articulation of a late-developing Germany is Thorstein Veblen’s Imperial Germany and 
the Industrial Revolution (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915). On Japan as a latecomer, see Robert A. 
Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1953), 396-7. Barrington Moore’s analysis of Germany’s and Japan’s long-term developmental trends and 
conflicts resulting from rapid modernization by an anachronistic regime from above may constitute another way 
of understanding the Axis. Still, similarities between Japan and Germany alone do not suffice as cause for the 
alliance. See Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1966), 228-313. 
4problems associated with treating the alliance as structurally foreordained. Taking the 
latecomer theory to its logical extreme, for instance, would compel one to argue that by 1871 
the completion of the Meiji Restoration and the foundation of the Kaiserreich had laid the 
cornerstone of the Berlin-Tokyo Axis. Yet such a claim downplays conflicts such as Japan’s 
resentment toward German participation in the Triple Intervention after the Sino-Japanese 
War, Wilhelm II’s support for Russia during the Russo-Japanese War and warnings of the 
“Yellow Peril,” Germany and Japan’s mutual hostility in the Great War, and contradictions 
between Nazi racial hubris and Japanese nationalistic hypersensitivity. Moreover, so far 
scholars have researched mainly the political and military aspects of German-Japanese 
cooperation between 1936 and 1945. Thus, while we have fine works on Japanese-German 
diplomacy, a comprehensive study of interwar German-Japanese relations encompassing 
culture, society, economy and technology still awaits to be written. 
In view of the shortcomings and skewed temporal focus of the previous approaches, 
press opinion in the 1920s and early 30s provides a unique tool for examining Japanese-
German relations. This period witnessed the rise of democracy and free speech in Germany 
and Japan. As society expressed itself through elections and mass media, an analysis of 
newspapers can reveal what Japanese and German readers could learn about each other. 
Though foreign policies rarely lie within public purview, decision-makers must still have 
been exposed to the media’s power to mold perceptions. In addition, the 1920s were the 
period when future leaders of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan came of age politically; 
what they read in the papers about the other country probably influenced their first 
impressions and presumptions. This essay thus aims to uncover how Japanese and Germans 
portrayed each other in their newspapers, specifically whether they accorded the other 
5country any privileged treatment as a potential ally. The first part of the essay explores the 
press images; the second explains why the papers depicted the other as such. Evidence 
indicates that despite the papers’ general interests in the other country’s culture, economy 
and society, they did not automatically endorse its actions but rather treated it as just one 
power among many. Moreover, the rise of Nazism prompted Japanese newspapers to single 
out Germany as ruthless in domestic politics and defiant in world affairs, while the growth of 
militarism in Japan drove the German press to denounce its aggression against China and 
faithlessness to the League of Nations.
CHAPTER II 
THE PRESS IN GERMANY AND JAPAN, 1919-1933 
Some comments on interwar newspapers will help contextualize the argument and 
explain how the press influenced popular moods. In Germany,6 as the Kaiserreich collapsed 
under defeat and revolution at the end of World War I, so disappeared all wartime media 
censorship. Leftist and rightist forces fought over leadership of the country, with each side 
churning out propaganda to argue its case and gain converts. Ultimately the “Weimar 
Coalition” of Social Democrats, German Democrats and Center Party established a republic 
and adopted a constitution quite liberal for its time. Article 118 proclaimed that “every 
German is entitled, within the bounds set by general law, to express his opinion freely in 
word, writing, print, image or otherwise… There is no censorship.”7 Although the 
constitution seemed to shield freedom of expression from persecution, the chink in this armor 
remained “the bounds set by general law” beyond which the press might not trespass. Indeed 
the police ordinances, regulations and emergency decrees the republic issued during its many 
crises limited the latitude of the media.8
6 See Peter J. Fliess, Freedom of the Press in the German Republic, 1918-1933 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1955); Kurt Koszyk, Deutsche Presse 1914-1945: Geschichte der deutschen 
Presse Teil III (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1972); Modris Eksteins, The Limits of Reason: The German 
Democratic Press and the Collapse of Weimar Democracy (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 70-103; 
and Rudolf Stöber, Deutsche Pressegeschichte: Einführung, Systematik, Glossar (Konstanz: UVK Medien, 
2000). 
 
7 Weimar Constitution, < http://www.zum.de/psm/weimar/weimar_vve.php> (accessed 9 November 
2005). 
 
8 Eksteins, 70. On Weimar press censorship, see Klaus Petersen, Zensur in der Weimarer Republik 
(Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler, 1995), 113-155. For example, the police frequently banned papers for 
espousing inflammatory language before key parliamentary or presidential elections in an attempt to reduce 
7Yet attempts to contain the press also conceded a tacit acknowledgement of the 
papers’ power to influence the public and to channel popular sentiments into political actions. 
While political rallies were impressive events, newspapers, unlike speeches, had staying 
power and the ability to reach the remotest hamlets, to explain nuanced arguments with 
clarity and to perform the crucial task of ideological news interpretation.9 Moreover, 
Germany was overwhelmingly literate and most midsized towns had access to their own 
dailies in addition to papers from nearby cities. Considering the broad reach of the press in 
informing the public and mobilizing opinion, we may use it as one medium to study 
Germany’s perception of the world. 
This essay examines six German papers spanning the political spectrum. From the far 
left stemmed Die Rote Fahne (The Red Banner), founded in November 1918 as the official 
organ of the Spartacus League and later the German Communist Party (Kommunistische 
Partei Deutschlands, KPD). The paper enjoyed an initial circulation of 30,000. Despite 
Weimar censors’ readiness to ban the paper for its incendiary language, circulation expanded 
to 140,000 by 1933. After the Reichstag Fire the Hitler regime outlawed the KPD and all 
communist publications.10 
Members of the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands,
SPD) made their voices heard in their organ Vorwärts (Forward), established in 1876 when 
 
street violence. Generally speaking the communist press suffered from censorship much more often than the 
Nazi papers. 
 
9 Ibid., 71. 
 
10 Kurt Koszyk, “Die Rote Fahne (1918-1933),” Deutsche Zeitungen des 17. bis 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. 
Heinz-Dietrich Fischer (Pullach bei München: Verlag Dokumentation, 1972), 391-403. Hereafter Deutsche 
Zeitungen. For more on the Rote Fahne, see Manfred Brauneck, Die Rote Fahne: Kritik, Theorie, Feuilleton 
1918-1933 (Munich: Fink, 1973); Burkhard Asmuss, Republik ohne Chance? Akzeptanz und Legitimation der 
Weimarer Republik in der deutschen Tagespresse zwischen 1918 und 1923 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 
63-66; Koszyk, Deutsche Presse, 321-345; Stöber, 223-227; and the reborn Rote Fahne’s website, Die Rote 
Fahne, <http://die-rote-fahne.de/>. 
8various leftist factions merged their publications to create an official paper. The Vorwärts hit 
its crest in 1918, with a circulation of 300,000 for both morning and evening editions. 
Throughout the 1920s support for the SPD eroded and the paper’s circulation shrank to 
82,000 in 1929. In May 1933 the Nazi regime dissolved the SPD and drove the Vorwärts 
underground.11 
Liberals and democrats represented themselves in the Vossische Zeitung (Voss’s 
Newspaper), the oldest newspaper in Berlin. Begun unofficially in 1617 the paper survived 
Prussian censors and gained a reputation for political independence and support for liberal 
causes. By 1848 Tante Voss (Auntie Voss) reigned as the largest German newspaper. In the 
1920s the paper advocated democracy and pro-business politics. Circulation peaked in 1931 
at around 81,000 before dwindling to 41,000 in 1934, shortly before the regime banned its 
publication.12 
The Germania, affiliated with the German Center Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei), 
spoke for Catholic interests. In 1871 the small Berlin Catholic community founded the paper 
to counter government and press attacks in the predominantly Protestant capital. Due to its 
skill in polemics and politically strategic location, the Germania eventually became a semi-
official channel of the Center Party even though it lacked the type of advertising and 
subscription revenues available to Catholic papers in the Rhineland and Bavaria. Circulation 
in 1929 reached 43,000.13 
11 Volker Schulze, “Vorwärts (1876-1933),” Deutsche Zeitungen, 329-347. For more on the Vorwärts,
see Asmuss, 60-62; Koszyk, Deutsche Presse, 303-321; Stöber, 221-223; and the resurrected Vorwärts’s 
website, Vorwärts, <http://www.vorwaerts.de/>. 
 
12 Klaus Bender, “Vossische Zeitung (1617-1934),” Deutsche Zeitungen, 25-39. For more on the 
Vossische Zeitung, see Koszyk, Deutsche Presse, 250-258; and Stöber, 211-213. 
 
13 Klaus Martin Stiegler, “Germania (1871-1938),” Deutsche Zeitungen, 299-313. For more on the 
Germania, see Asmuss, 52-54; Koszyk, Deutsche Presse, 290-302; and Stöber, 217-220. 
9The Neue Preußische Kreuz-Zeitung (New Prussian Cross Newspaper) catered to the 
traditional, nationalistic conservatives. Though never an official party paper, the Kreuz-
Zeitung cooperated closely with the rightist German National People’s Party 
(Deutschnationale Volkspartei, DNVP) and its paramilitary formation Stahlhelm (Steel 
Helmet). Since the DNVP served as junior coalition partner in the Hitler regime, the Kreuz-
Zeitung managed to survive until 1939. Maximum circulation was about 60,000.14 
To the extreme right belonged the Völkischer Beobachter (People’s Observer), the 
official organ of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP).15 In 1920 the Nazi Party purchased a newspaper of a 
Munich suburb and transformed it into a propaganda outlet. Throughout the 1920s the paper 
like its parent party languished in the margin. Circulation surged after the Nazi electoral 
breakthrough in 1930 so that after Hitler’s appointment in 1933 the figure reached 310,000.16 
While the runs of these papers may appear small in a nation of some 65 million, it 
bears stressing the fragmented state of Weimar press in which no paper dominated nationally 
as The Times did in Britain. Germany’s political and publishing landscapes, with regional 
capitals like Hamburg, Munich and Frankfurt competing with Berlin, also contributed to this 
decentralization. Moreover, non-subscribers could read papers posted on boards, in 
restaurants, barbershops and libraries. Lastly, papers like the Rote Fahne and Völkischer 
 
14 Meinolf Rohleder and Burkhard Treude, “Neue Preussische (Kreuz-) Zeitung (1848-1939),” 
Deutsche Zeitungen, 209-224. For more on the Kreuz-Zeitung, see Koszyk, Deutsche Presse, 240-242; and 
Stöber, 214-217. 
 
15 The word völkisch, a cognate of the English “folk,” defies concise translations. Volk convokes the 
romantic image of a clan or tribal community jelled together by ethnic, historical, mythical and cultural ties. 
 
16 Margarete Plewnia, “Völkischer Beobachter (1887-1945),” Deutsche Zeitungen, 381-390. For more 
on the Völkischer Beobachter, see Adolf Dresler, Geschichte des “Völkischen Beobachters” und des 
Zentralverlages der NSDAP (Munich: F. Eher Nachf., 1937); Asmuss, 39-43; Koszyk, Deutsche Presse, 380-
388; and Stöber, 227-231. 
10
Beobachter appeared in local editions as well, and the parties did not hesitate to churn out 
competing publications in any one market. Nazis in Berlin could choose between the 
Beobachter and Der Angriff (The Attack),17 socialists between the Vorwärts and Der Abend 
(The Evening), and communists among the Welt am Abend (World in the Evening), Arbeiter 
Illustrierte Zeitung (Workers’ Illustrated Newspaper) and Rote Fahne.18 Together party-
affiliated newspapers constituted half of all papers, with the rest taking their cues from 
ideological standard bearers like the Beobachter or Vorwärts. The politically diverse 
newspapers studied in this essay should furnish a fair representation of the Weimar press. 
Newspapers arrived in Japan in the early 1860s either as translated Western sheets for 
a few Shogunate leaders or commercial bulletins composed by foreigners.19 After the Meiji 
Restoration the press grew rapidly, thanks to the breathtaking Westernization campaign to 
expand literacy and to adopt the latest print technology. In the 1870s and 80s newspapers 
became politicized and unofficial party mouthpieces through participation in heated political 
 
17 For more on other Nazi publications, see Russel Lemmons, Goebbels and Der Angriff (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1994); Dennis Showalter, Little Man, What Now? Der Stürmer in the Weimar 
Republic (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); Peter Stein, Die NS-Gaupresse, 1925-1933: Forschungsbericht, 
Quellenkritik, neue Bestandsaufnahme (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1987); and Oron J. Hale, The Captive Press in the 
Third Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964). 
 
18 For more on other communist publications, see Sean McMeekin, The Red Millionaire: A Political 
Biography of Willi Münzenberg, Moscow's Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West, 1917-1940 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003). 
 
19 See Hanazono Kanesada ????, The Development of Japanese Journalism (Osaka: The Osaka 
Mainichi, 1924); Suzuki BunshirZ?????, Japanese Journalism, vol. 10 Western Influences in Modern 
Japan (Tokyo: The Japanese Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1929); and Hayasaka JirZ????, An 
Outline of the Japanese Press (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1938). For a post-World War 
II view, see ItZ Masanori, “History of the Japanese Press,” The Japanese Press: Past and Present (Tokyo: The 
Japan Newspaper Publishers’ and Editors’ Association [??????, Nihon shinbun kyZkai], 1949), 4-15. 
For more current studies, see James L. Huffman, Creating a Public: People and Press in Meiji Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997); Susan J. Pharr, “Media and Politics in Japan: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives,” Media and Politics in Japan, eds. Susan J. Pharr and Ellis S. Krauss (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 1996), 3-17; chapter 3 in Ejiri Susumu ???, Characteristics of the Japanese 
Press (Tokyo: Nihon shinbun kyZkai, 1972), 82-138; and William de Lange, A History of Japanese Journalism: 
Japan’s Press Club as the Last Obstacle to a Mature Press (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Japan Library, 1998). 
11
debates. Yet as readership expanded, the papers relied more on subscription for support and 
less on the editors’ connection to political parties.20 
The press’s drive for profit by adopting populism pitted it against the government’s 
proclaimed authority to monitor printed words. In addition to censorship, a libel law had been 
on the books since 1875 and the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 further limited the latitude 
in reporting.21 In practice, however, the censor’s red ink ebbed and flowed with the level of 
social tension. Whereas during the Great War officials terminated pro-German foreign 
newspapers and punished the Asahi Shinbun (????, The Asahi Daily) for criticizing 
Japan’s intervention in Siberia, the period of our concern, the 1920s and early 30s, 
overlapped with the era known as TaishZ Democracy that witnessed advances in suffrage and 
party politics, social stability, economic growth and international peace – hence laxer 
restriction of the press.22 
This essay surveys five newspapers spanning the political spectrum. From the far left 
stemmed the Akahata (??, Red Banner), founded in 1928 as the organ of the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP). Although estimating the circulation of the paper of an outlawed 
party poses a challenge, the Akahata did show signs of greater organization and presumably 
 
20 See Kawabé KisaburZ?????, The Press and Politics in Japan: A Study of the Relation 
Between the Newspaper and the Political Development of Modern Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1921), and Lee Jung Bock, The Political Character of the Japanese Press (Seoul: Seoul National University 
Press, 1985). 
 
21 See Henry Emerson Wildes, “Press Freedom in Japan,” The American Journal of Sociology, no. 4 
(Jan. 1927): 601-614, and chapter 5, “Censorship and Extra-legal Supervision” in his The Press and Social 
Currents in Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 104-134. The Newspaper Law of 1905 also 
toughened punishment for violations of existing press regulations. 
 
22 See Part I of Gregory J. Kasza, The State and the Mass Media in Japan, 1918-1945 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988). Richard H. Mitchell, in his Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), depicts a trend of relentlessly tightening censorship until 1945. Yet one 
cannot deny that press control in the 1920s and early 30s paled in comparison to that during World War I and 
after the outbreak of full hostility with China in 1937. 
12
popularity after its inception by evolving from handwritten leaflets to lithographs to 
newsprints by a press with movable types. In 1935 the Akahata printed its last issue after the 
virtual extinction of the JCP, even as an underground organization.23 
From the moderate left came the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, which, according to one 
observer, “prides itself on being the most liberal Japanese newspaper, mostly read by 
intellectuals, members of the liberal professions and business men.”24 Despite this reputation 
and its willingness to challenge censors by breaking banned news such as post-1918 social 
unrest, the Asahi also proved capable of profiting from jingoism by inciting enthusiasm for 
the Manchurian Incident.25 Partly due to its appeal to both the elite and ordinary readers, the 
Asahi reigned as the most popular paper until 1945, with a circulation in the Tokyo area 
approaching one million.26 
The Yomiuri Shinbun (The Daily Yomiuri), founded in 1874 as an “inconspicuous 
arts paper confined to literary and to cultural affairs,” belonged approximately to the center 
right.27 In the late 1920s one observer commented that it reported news in an “incidental” or 
“casual” style.28 Yet under a new management in the 1930s the Yomiuri transformed itself to 
 
23 Preface to the paper’s 1954 reprinting, in Akahata: HigIhI jidai no nihon kyIsantI chJI kikanshi ?
?:????????????????, 1928-1933. For more on the Akahata, see also the revived paper’s 
website, Shinbun akahata ??????, <http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/>. 
 
24 Guenther Stein, “Through the Eyes of a Japanese Newspaper Reader,” Pacific Affairs 9, no. 2 (Jun. 
1936): 177. 
 
25 See Chapter 3, “War Fever: Imperial Jingoism and the Mass Media,” in Louise Young, Japan’s 
Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), 55-114. 
 
26 For more on the Asahi, see A. Morgan Young, 414; Suzuki, 11-15; Wildes, Press and Social 
Currents, 38-40; Lee, 19-21; Hayasaka, 8-12; and the newspaper’s website, Asahi Daily ????,
<http://www.asahi.com/>. 
 
27 ItZ, 13; and Wildes, Press and Social Currents, 33. 
 
28 Wildes, Press and Social Currents, 33. 
13
gain subscription by turning “somewhat more nationalistic, sensational and popular” than the 
Asahi.29 By 1938 the paper had grown its circulation phenomenally to 950,000.30 
The Kokumin Shinbun (????, The Peoples’ Newspaper) appealed to the 
nationalistic right. Following the political sojourn of its colorful founder, the social critic 
Tokutomi SohZ (????), the paper abandoned liberalism for populist nationalism and 
xenophobia; one commentator recalled that Tokutomi “rants very heartily on such subjects as 
the White Peril.”31 After the Russo-Japanese War the Kokumin aligned itself with the 
government but alienated the public for defending unpopular policies like suppressing news 
of post-1918 unrest. Though still a major paper in the 1930s, its circulation dwindled to 
around 100,000.32 
The political bearing of The Japan Times and Mail, a Japanese-edited paper in 
English, eludes simple generalization since it eclectically reprinted Japanese editorials and 
Western articles. Potential readers included foreigners and Japanese eager to improve their 
English or knowledge of foreign views, but under heavy competition for such a limited 
market the Times could not have attracted enough subscribers to maintain financial buoyancy. 
 
29 Stein, 177. For more on the Yomiuri, see Young, 413; Suzuki, 15-16; Lee, 24-27; Hayasaka, 14-16; 
and the newspaper’s website, Yomiuri Online ????, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/>. 
 
30 Hayasaka, 6. 
 
31 A. Morgan Young, 416. 
 
32 For more on the Kokumin, see Leslie Russell Oates, Populist Nationalism in Prewar Japan: A 
Biography of Nakano SeigI (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 12; ItZ, 6; Lee, 29-33; Wildes, 42-44; Hayasaka, 
18; and John D. Pierson, Tokutomi SohI, 1863-1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980). 
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Indeed evidence suggests that the paper accepted government subsidies to disseminate 
official viewpoints.33 
As was the case in Germany, the Japanese authorities’ eagerness to censor the press 
only betrayed the influence newspapers wielded in society. Indeed, during much of the 
interwar period the papers worked as powerful organizations capable of reaching the avidly 
literate Japanese. Many families received more than one paper, so that by 1927 the number of 
subscriptions in Tokyo exceeded the number of households by 130,000.34 In addition, 
corporations and government offices often placed newspapers in reception areas and 
employee lounges, a practice till popular today. An American sociologist remarked in 1929 
that “most Japanese… agree in stating that the press should be regarded as the influential 
factor working toward improvement in social and political conditions.”35 The two largest 
press groups, the Asahi and the Mainichi (??), published newspapers in various cities and 
each boasted a combined daily circulation of about two million. In turn these papers 
generated enough profits to enable their parent firms to perform myriad social functions. For 
example, the Asahi and Mainichi groups each ran its own telephone and telegraph services, 
and an airline to bring home news from the continent. They also organized fundraising drives 
to assist disaster victims or collect funds for naval construction.36 Considering the 
newspapers’ broad reach and impact on society outside informing the public and molding 
opinion, we may depend on them as one medium to study Japan’s perception of the world. 
 
33 Wildes, Press and Social Currents, 374-5. Wildes cites as proof his conversations with government 
officials about the existence of the subsidies. For more on the Times, see the newspaper’s website, The Japan 
Times Online, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/>. 
 
34 Huffman, 363. 
 
35 Wildes, Press and Social Currents, 53. 
 
36 Suzuki, 15-17. 
CHAPTER III 
JAPAN IN FINE PRINT 
In the period studied German newspapers showed interest in Japanese athleticism, 
culture and traditions, yet at times they still viewed Japan with some lingering exoticism. In 
addition, the press saw Japan as economically unstable, perceived it as just another 
imperialist power, and abhorred Japanese aggression and untruthfulness in its interaction 
with the League of Nations. 
 
Athleticism 
The papers expressed much interest in and admiration for Japanese athletes, 
especially tennis players and swimmers who participated in international competitions. In 
1933 the Japanese tennis team arrived in Berlin to compete with Germany for advancement 
in the Davis Cup. The Vossische Zeitung, having witnessed during the French Open that the 
Japanese were “fast like weasels,” already expected a tough match.37 The Kreuz-Zeitung also 
foresaw a challenge for the Germans.38 Yet the visitors’ annihilation of the host team still 
shocked and impressed the papers. An account of the singles matches praised the 
 
37 „Vor allem Nunoi zeigte phantastische Sachen; beide sind schnell wie die Wiesel und nehmen die 
schwersten Bälle,“ in “Japans hervorragendes Doppel” (Japan’s excellent double), Vossische Zeitung: 
Berlinische Zeitung von Staats- und gelehrten Sachen, 27 May 1933, Evening Edition. Hereafter VZ. Unlike in 
English, comparing someone to a weasel in German carries no negative connotation. 
 
38 “Unsere Chancen gegen Japan. Die Gäste rechnen mit leichtem Sieg” (Our chance against Japan. 
The guests anticipate easy victory), Neue Preußische Kreuz-Zeitung, 9 June 1933. Hereafter KZ. 
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“resourceful, cold-blooded and strong” Japanese player.39 The next day’s article on the 
doubles matches reprimanded the lackluster German team but also acknowledged the “fair 
and tireless” Japanese team for its tactics and for playing like a machine.40 Japanese 
swimmers too captured headlines. After a solid showing in the 1928 Olympics, Japanese 
swimmers impressed German journalists with their victory over the hitherto dominant 
Americans in 1931. The reporter looked forward to an exciting rematch in the 1932 
Olympics but also lamented the “totally hopeless situation” of German swimmers.41 By 1933 
a sufficiently impressed Völkischer Beobachter reported that the Japanese held the world’s 
first, second, third, fourth or fifth place in a whole range of aquatic events.42 
In other sports the papers generally appreciated interaction with Japan. The Vossische 
Zeitung, for example, urged Berliners to consider the invitation by the Osaka Asahi to a 
Brandenburg soccer club for exhibition games in Japan.43 The Rote Fahne looked forward to 
the first ever jiu-jitsu and judo matches between German worker athletes and Japanese, “both 
masters in their classes.”44 When Professor KanZ JigorZ (?????), the founder of judo, 
 
39 „Gottfried von Cramm fand von Spielbeginn an gegen  S a t o h  sein Selbstvertrauen nicht, und es 
war einem so findigen, kaltblütigen und starken Gegner gegenüber zu spät, als er seine sonstige Form 
gewaltsam erkämpfte,“ in “Japans entscheidender 2:0 Vorsprung” (Japan’s decisive 2:0 lead), VZ, 10 June 1933. 
 
40 „Wie eine tadellos arbeitende Machine spielten die fairen und ermüdlichen Gäste zusammem,“ in 
“Japan hat’s schon geschafft. Unsere Davispokal-Niederlage – Satoh-Nunois leichter Sieg im Doppel” (Japan 
succeeded already. Our Davis Cup defeat – Sato and Nunoi’s easy victory in doubles), VZ, 11 June 1933. 
 
41 „Ganz hoffnungslos aber ist die Lage für die deutschen Kraulschwimmer,“ in “Japans Schwimmer 
vor Amerika” (Japan’s swimmers on top America), VZ, 4 September 1931. See also “Japan besiegt Amerika” 
(Japan defeats America), Germania, 4 September 1931. Hereafter G. 
 
42 “Japans Schwimmer in Front” (Japan’s swimmers in front), Völkischer Beobachter: Kampfblatt der 
nationalsozialistischen Bewegung Großdeutschlands, 8-9 January 1933. Hereafter VB. 
 
43 “Japanische Einladung an den V.B.B. Eine Berliner Vereinself soll nach Japan” (Japanese invitation 
to the Brandenburg Football Club. A Berlin club’s eleven said headed to Japan), VZ, 8 October 1931. 
 
44 „Zum ersten Male starten Japaner gegen Arbeitersportler in Deutschland. Beide sind Meister ihrer 
Klasse,“ in “Japaner am Start Essen-Berlin” (Japanese to start in Essen and Berlin), Die Rote Fahne: 
Zentralorgan der kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands, 1 October 1932. Hereafter RF. 
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visited Germany, the Völkischer Beobachter somehow linked KanZ’s effort to promote 
exercise in daily life in Japan with Nazi indoctrination programs.45 Whatever their ideologies, 
the papers appreciated the achievements of Japanese athletes. 
Despite this respect for Japanese sportsmen, the press ultimately seemed more 
interested in German athletes. Admiration for Japanese prowess in tennis and aquatics served 
also as a mirror to reflect badly on Germany’s performance, and the more ideologically 
extreme papers freely saw what they chose to see in Japanese athletics. Moreover, athleticism 
alone did not constitute the decisive quality of a potential ally. When Australia eliminated 
Japan in the Davis Cup the papers found it unimaginable that anyone could defeat the team 
that routed Germany, yet none advocated closer cooperation with Australia as a result. 
 
Culture, Tradition and Inscrutable Japan 
The newspapers showed a definite interest in Japanese culture and tradition covering 
performance and visual arts, movies, literature, travelogues and expert commentaries. Often 
the papers advertised artistic performances with Japanese themes, indicating a public 
curiosity in Japan. One of the most successful musical comedies, The Geisha, appeared to be 
quite popular, running continuously for at least seventy-five nights in the first half of 1919 
alone.46 Even in 1932, over thirty years after the musical’s birth, a commentator still found it 
interesting enough to preview a performance.47 German opera fans also had access to 
 
45 “Exz. Professor Dr. Jigoro Kano in Berlin” (His Excellence Professor Jigoro Kano in Berlin), VB, 
17 June 1933. 
 
46 Advertisement, “DIE GEISHA” (THE GEISHA), VZ, 29 March 1919. 
 
47 Dr. Fritz Brust, “‘Die Geisha,’” G, 1 January 1932. 
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Madama Butterfly by Giacomo Puccini.48 On the big screen moviegoers could see Japan-
themed films like Die Kwannon von Okadera (The Kwannon of Okadera), directed by the 
pioneer cinematographer Carl Froelich.49 
Besides performance arts and films Japanese visual arts and literature also received 
press coverage. For example, the Vossische Zeitung recommended an exhibition of 
woodblock prints reflecting Japan’s impressions of foreigners in the 17th and 18th centuries.50 
The Germania meanwhile had an expert contribute an article familiarizing readers with 
Japanese poetry.51 Readers could also find short stories, such as one on Yoshiwara, the 
pleasure quarter of old Edo, by the acclaimed journalist and author Hans Natonek.52 The 
Marxist Rote Fahne and Vorwärts respectively carried poems and short stories on the life of 
workers in Japan.53 
Firsthand accounts by celebrities provided the press with the means to satisfy readers’ 
curiosity about Japan. In the 1920s and early 30s travelers could find only two reliable 
options to journey from Germany to Japan – the Hamburg-Amerika Line or Norddeutscher 
 
48 Advertisement, KZ, 21 January 1932. 
 
49 Advertisement, VZ, 1 January 1921. 
 
50 M. O., “Japanischer Europäer-Spiegel. Die ältesten künstlerischen Darstellungen” (Japanese mirror 
of Europeans. The oldest artistic exhibitions), VZ, 29 September 1931. 
 
51 P. Dr. Andreas Eckardt, “Japanische Poesie” (Japanese poetry), G, 3 March 1932. 
 
52 Hans Natonek, “Yoshiwara,” VZ, 3 August 1919. Natonek authored several novels and short stories, 
and worked as the chief editor of the Neue Leipziger Zeitung from 1917 to 1933. 
 
53 Moriyama Kae, “Aus der Mandschurei zieht der Sturm auf” (A storm rises from Manchuria), RF, 15 
March 1932; and Fritz Tenes, “Takagi streikt. Aus dem japanischen Arbeiterleben” (Takagi strikes. From the 
life of a Japanese worker), V, 5 October 1932. 
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Lloyd Line.54 Such a costly and time-consuming voyage remained out of reach to most; small 
wonder then readers had to experience Japan vicariously. Hanns Maria Lux, a writer of some 
standing, shared his tour to ancient Nara with readers of the Germania.55 Adventure seekers 
would relish the account by Wolfgang von Gronau when he visited Japan during his 
circumnavigation flight in 1932.56 
In addition to travelogues expert commentaries sought to educate the public about 
Japan. The journal by Professor Carl Heinrich Becker, a former Prussian minister of culture, 
appealed to the educated and businesslike audience of the Vossische Zeitung.57 Of the papers 
studied only the Vossische Zeitung had its own correspondent in Japan, Professor J. Plaut, to 
explain regularly aspects of Japanese culture like New Year’s rituals.58 The Völkischer 
Beobachter used its own Japanologist, Professor Karl Haushofer, the father of geopolitics, to 
enlighten readers about Japanese traditions.59 After several fires in Tokyo the paper revealed 
that half of the buildings in the “so-called ‘modern’ city Tokyo” were still built with wood 
 
54 Advertisement, “Deutsche Frachtdampferlinie nach OSTASIEN” (German cargo steamer to EAST 
ASIA), VZ, 4 November 1921. The Trans-Siberian Railway depended on Soviet goodwill. Lufthansa flights to 
East Asia did not become available until 1938. 
 
55 Hanns Maria Lux, “Reisebrief aus Nara-Japan” (Travel letter from Nara-Japan), G, 9-10 September 
1931. Lux served as leader of the Nazi Reichsschrifttumskammer, proof that he occupied a notable place in the 
literary scene. 
 
56 Wolfgang von Gronau, “Hier erzählt: W. von Gronau. Im deutschen Flugboot um den Erdball” (W. 
von Gronau describes here. In a German seaplane around the globe), VB, 11-13 December 1932. Von Gronau 
fought as a pilot during World War I. During World War II he served as a military attaché in the German 
embassy in Tokyo. 
 
57 C. H. Becker, “Reise-Eindrücke aus Ostasien” (Travel impressions from East Asia), VZ, 5 February 
1933. 
 
58 J. Plaut, “Neujahr in Japan” (New Year in Japan), VZ, 21 February 1921. 
 
59 Prof. Dr. Karl Haushofer, “Sitten und Gebräuche in Japan” (Conventions and customs in Japan), VB, 
15-16 January 1933. The German army sent Haushofer to Japan in 1908 as an advisor and instructor for the 
Japanese army. Haushofer became a convinced Japanophile in the process. 
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and paper.60 The Japanese emperor too aroused some curiosity. A reporter for the Kreuz-
Zeitung told anecdotes of the monarch disguising as a commoner to inspect his countrymen’s 
livelihood under his reign.61 
Although the newspapers exhibited real interest in Japanese culture and tradition, they 
remained a product of the stereotypes and Eurocentrism prevalent in the period. The Kreuz-
Zeitung applauded Tokyo’s decision to make students learn to Romanize the Japanese 
alphabet, predicting enthusiastically that abandoning the ancient characters would only bring 
positive results to Japan, much like Atatürk’s Latinization of Turkish.62 Nor could the 
commentators refrain from making blanket statements like “the Japanese found no 
architectural style of their own.”63 Oftentimes the press seemed more interested in how 
prevalent German culture had become in Japan rather than in Japanese culture itself. The 
nationalistic Kreuz-Zeitung understandably focused on the popularity in Japan of German 
war movies and the adoption of German print technology by Japanese newspapers.64 And the 
Germania discussed the reception of German paintings in Tokyo.65 Even the internationalist 
 
60 „Die sogenannte ,moderne’ Stadt Tokio,“ in Walter Rietschel, “Warum brennt es so viel in Tokio?” 
(Why does Tokyo catch on fire so much?), VB, 7 January 1933. 
 
61 Hans Helbig, “Der Doppelgänger des Mikado” (The doppelganger of the Mikado), KZ, 6 January 
1933. 
 
62 “Japan schreibt Lateinisch” (Japan writes Latin), KZ, 23 June 1933. 
 
63 „Die Japaner haben keinen eigenen neuen Stil gefunden,“ in Erich v. Salzmann, “Neu-Tokyo” (New 
Tokyo), VZ, 8 June 1921, Evening Edition. 
 
64 “Film-Aufschwung in Japan” (Movie boom in Japan), Kreuz-Zeitung, 20 January 1933; and “Japans 
Zeitungsriesen: Deutsche Machinen – musterhafte Einrichtungen” (Japan’s newspaper giants: German machines 
– exemplary organization), KZ, 12 April 1933. 
 
65 “Mutter und Kind in Japan. Die Ausstellung in Tokio” (Mother and child in Japan. The exhibition in 
Tokyo), G, 28 May 1933. 
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Vorwärts expressed pleasant surprise that Japanese orchestras and choirs played Beethoven’s 
symphonies and sang Haydn’s Die Schöpfung (The Creation) in German.66 
Thus, although the press expressed curiosity in Japanese traditions, at times Japan 
seemed to garner praise for being a diligent student of Western civilization rather than 
maintaining its own culture. Moreover, information on Japan in the press stemmed from 
Westerners writing about Japan rather than from the Japanese themselves, as Western writers 
created the operas, movies, short stories, travelogues and commentaries available to the 
proverbial German in the street. In particular, the plots of both The Geisha and Madama 
Butterfly revolved around the interaction between a European male and a Japanese female. In 
The Geisha, an already-engaged English sailor excused his kissing a geisha by saying that he 
was only introducing her to the magic of the Western way of life.67 In Madama Butterfly, a
geisha jilted by an American sailor stoically committed ritual suicide because she could not 
bear the shame that her lover had married an American woman: “To die with honor, when 
 
66 Klaus Pringsheim, “Deutsche Musik in Japan. Ein Beitrag zur inneren Wandlung der japanischen 
Kultur” (German music in Japan. An article on the inner metamorphosis of Japanese culture), V, 9 July 1932. 
 
67 The dialogue between the sailor Fairfax and the geisha Mimosa is too good to miss. I beg my 
readers’ indulgence: 
Fairfax: You don’t give away a heart with every verse, do you, little Almond-eye – not even a kiss! 
 Mimosa: A what? 
 Fairfax:  A kiss! 
 Mimosa: A kiss? We do not have them in Japan. 
 Fairfax:  What? No kisses in this country? Now, here’s something for me to teach you. 
 Mimosa: What is it – a kiss? 
 Fairfax:  You’re a charming little geisha, 
 Quite the nicest girl in Asia, 
 But I fear there’s something missing, 
 Oh, my pretty Japanese! 
 English, French and German misses 
 Do not ask me what a kiss is, 
 They are all expert at kissing. 
From Act I, in Sidney Jones, The Geisha: A Story of a Tea House, a Japanese Musical Play in Two 
Acts (London: Hopwood & Crew, 1896). 
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one can no longer live with honor.”68 Although we have no sure way to uncover whether 
German audiences seriously believed what we today consider stereotypes about Japan, we do 
know for certain that the papers’ depiction of Japan consisted mainly of Western constructs 
of how they imagined Japan should be. 
Since the newspapers already had a preconception of Japan, they voiced their surprise 
and explained as mysterious instances when reality defied their expectation. One such 
preconceived idea had it that close ethnic and cultural ties linked China and Japan in one East 
Asian bloc. The Vossische Zeitung, commenting on the Manchurian Incident, suggested that 
Japan had forgotten the Chinese origins of its script, literature, art, statecraft and religion.69 
The Vorwärts remarked too that Japanese and Chinese should be “ethnic brothers.”70 Yet 
when the conflict continued, the press became frustrated in its inability to scrutinize East 
Asian affairs. The Kreuz-Zeitung, after searching for answers to the question of “what this 
‘yellow war’ is all about,” advised readers to pay close attention to Asia’s “sphinx face.”71 
The Vossische Zeitung meanwhile mused that the war made no political sense to anyone 
outside the Japanese officer corps.72 When Japan’s representative to the League, Matsuoka 
YZsuke (????), tried to justify Japan’s action in Manchuria by claiming that the 
Japanese mentality differed fundamentally from the West’s, the Vorwärts commented dryly 
 
68 Giacomo Puccini, Madama Butterfly: A Japanese Tragedy (New York: G. Ricordi, 1905). 
 
69 “Japan fühlt sich jeder Lage gewachsen” (Japan feels like rising to every occasion), VZ, 22 
December 1931. 
 
70 „Beide können viel leichter Russisch als die Sprache des Rassenbruders erlernen,“ in Nathan Gurdus, 
“Chinesisch-Japanische Momentbilder” (Contemporary images of Chinese and Japanese), V, 3 December 1931. 
 
71 „Aber Asiens Sphinxgesicht erfordert unsere Aufmerksamtkeit, und es its immer besser, auf 
Entwicklungen vorbereitet zu sein, als sich von ihnen überraschen zu lassen,“ in “Der gelbe Krieg” (The yellow 
war), KZ, 6 March 1932, Pictorial Supplement. 
 
72 Dr. Sven von Müller, “Der Schwarze Drache” (The Black Dragon), VZ, 17 May 1932. 
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that if Japan could not comprehend elementary moral concepts then indeed its mentality 
would stand totally foreign to a “Western” one.73 The Kreuz-Zeitung verged on giving up 
attempting to solve the mystery, “What does Japan want?” – a question “almost impossible 
for the white men to answer.”74 It also complained that the European simply could not put 
himself into the position of the Japanese, since “the thoughts and feeling of the Asians 
remained perpetually secretive and unsolvable.”75 Finally, the Vossische Zeitung conceded 
that Japanese domestic politics presented quite a “riddle” for Western observers to tackle.76 
Thus by the newspapers’ own admission Japanese domestic and external politics faced 
Europeans with a puzzle wrapped in an enigma. By portraying Japan as so inscrutable, the 
press could not be reserving a favored spot for Japan as a potential ally for Germany. 
 
Economy 
In the Weimar period the press paid close attention to Japan’s economy and focused 
on three conflicting but related aspects: the economy grew as Japan engaged in territorial 
 
73 „Man soll also lieber die Konsequenzen ziehen und Japan aus dem Völkerbund ausscheiden lassen, 
der auf jenen elementaren ‚westlichen’ Moralbegriffen beruht, die den Japanern völlig fremd sind, als daß man 
der anders gearteten japanischen Mentalität zuliebe das schuldlose und ohnmächtige China seinem Schicksal 
preisgibt,“ in “Neue japanische Gewalttaten. Während der Völkerbund verhandelt…” (New Japanese atrocities, 
while the League of Nations deliberates…), V, 23 November 1932, Evening Edition. 
 
74 „Bei der Rätselhaftigkeit der ostasiatischen Denkart für uns weißrassige Menschen erscheint es 
schwierig und fast unmöglich, mit einiger Gewißheit die Frage ,Was will Japan?’“ in “Was will Japan?” (What 
does Japan want?), KZ, 7 January 1933. 
 
75 „Dem Europäer wird das Denken und Fühlen des Asiaten immer geheimnisvoll und unlösbar 
bleiben; er vermag sich in seine Gedankengänge mit ihren tiefsten hintergründen kaum hineinzuversetzen,“ in 
“Alarmschüsse aus Japan” (Shots of alarm from Japan), KZ, 18 May 1932. 
 
76 „Das merkwürdige Geheimnis, mit dem der Fall umgeben wird, und das für Außenstehende 
lächerlich geringe Gewicht der Gründe, die für die Notwendigkeit des Regierungswechsels ins Feld geführt 
werden, geben dem abendländischen Beobachter wieder einmal Rätsel der japanischen Innenpolitik auf,“ in 
“Faschismus in Japan?” (Fascism in Japan?), VZ, 24 May 1933. 
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expansion and rearmament, the resultant state of crisis the economy plunged into from 
overheating, and Japan’s menacing attempts to export its way out of its financial straits. 
 Japan’s economic growth in the 1920s and relatively quick recovery from the world 
economic crisis after 1929 impressed the newspapers. After the Versailles Conference the 
Germania carried an article detailing how the Japanese economy had benefited from the 
Great War at Europe’s expense by reducing foreign debt and increasing exports.77 The 
expansion in Japan’s shipping industry in particular caught the attention of the papers. In 
1921 the Vossische Zeitung advised readers not to dismiss the claim of the shipping concern 
Nippon Y^sen Kaisha (??????) to be “the world’s largest shipping company.”78 After 
the outbreak of the Great Depression the same paper reported that while Europe languished 
in economic doldrums, Japanese shipping remained active and profitable.79 And as Japan 
imported more iron from Germany in 1933 to sustain its invasion of North China and 
rearmament program, the Vossische Zeitung celebrated with a sigh of relief Japanese 
purchasing power in a time of sliding commodity prices.80 
Though impressed with Japan’s performance, the press did not blind itself to Japan’s 
financial straits, several of which resulted exactly from the phenomenal expansion. In fact the 
 
77 “Die Entwicklung des japanischen Handels” (The development of Japanese commerce), G, 4 August 
1919, Evening Edition. 
 
78 „,Nippon Yusen Kaisha. Größte Handels-Reederei der Welt,’“ in “Von der japanischen Schiffahrt” 
(From Japanese shipping), VZ, 7 January 1921. 
 
79 “Schiffarts-Konjunktur in Japan” (Business cycle of shipping in Japan), VZ, 23 March 1933; and 
“Lebhafte Ostasienfahrt” (Lively East Asian Voyage), VZ, 2 April 1933. 
 
80 “Japanische Käufe am Eisenmarkt” (Japanese purchases in iron market), VZ, 30 March 1933, 
Evening Edition; “Ostasiatische Eisenkäufe” (East Asian iron purchases), VZ, 5 Jaunary 1933; and “Japan als 
Eisenkäufer. Vollbeschäftigte Rüstungsindustrie” (Japan as iron buyer. Fully-employed armament industries), 
VZ, 2 February 1933, Evening Edition. 
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word Krise (crisis) appeared regularly in articles on the Japanese economy.81 Already in 1921, 
merely two years after Versailles, the Vossische Zeitung noted that Japan, a Great War victor, 
suffered from the typical postwar ailments of inflation and government spending swollen by 
military provisions, which in Japan’s case ate up an atypical 50 per cent of the entire budget. 
The correspondent, the abovementioned Professor Plaut, could not hide his shock, “In the 
history of the world there exists no precedent in which military outlay made up half of the 
entire budget of a people in peacetime.”82 Six years later, as Japan launched a naval 
construction program to replace older ships, he again questioned why Japan needed new 
weapons in a time of financial stress when it recognized no obvious enemies beyond the 
horizon.83 Later, in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, the press across the political 
spectrum attributed heavy financial burdens to Japan’s adventurism. The Völkischer 
Beobachter reported that Tokyo had to float 35-50 million Yen of debts to cover the 
expedition.84 As Japan abandoned the gold standard late in 1931 the Germania linked this 
course of action to the costs of operation in Manchuria.85 The Vossische Zeitung, while 
acknowledging Japan’s desire to protect its investments in Manchuria, remarked that the war 
 
81 For example, „Angesichts der schweren  w i r t s c h a f t l i c h e n  K r i s e, welche Japan im 
verflossenen Jahre durchgemacht hat, und die es noch lange nicht überwunden zu haben scheint, wenn auch 
vielleicht die schwierigsten Augenblicke vorüber sind, dürften einige Angaben über die japanischen Finanzen 
von allgemeinem Interesse sein,“ in “Japanische Finanzen” (Japanese finances), VZ, 14 February 1921, 
Evening Edition; and Wilhelm Schulze, “Der Yen in der Krise” (The Yen in the crisis), VZ, 15 June 1933. 
 
82 „In der Geschichte der Welt liegt kein Präzedenzfall dafür vor, daß die militärischen Ausgaben eines 
Volkes in Friedenszeiten  n a h e z u  d i e  h ä l f t e  s e i n e r  G e s a m t a u s g a b e n  betragen sollen,“ in J. 
Plaut, “Die Sorgen der Sieger” (The worries of the victors), VZ, 24 February 1921. 
 
83 J. Plaut, “Japans Flottenprogramm” (Japan’s fleet program), VZ, 9 Jaunary 1927, Post Edition. 
 
84 “Völkerbundsrat schwätzt – Japan marschiert” (League of Nation council speculates – Japan 
marches), VB, 24 November 1931. 
 
85 “Japan verläßt den Goldstandard. Die Kosten des mandschurischen Abenteuers” (Japan abandons the 
gold standard. The costs of the Manchuria adventure), G, 17 December 1931. 
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in China pushed the border of economic rationality by risking American sanctions.86 Both 
Marxist papers, the Vorwärts and Rote Fahne, saw the conflict as one in which an imperialist 
power acted aggressively in response to economic pressures.87 
Besides viewing Japan’s armament program and military engagement as 
“overextending itself,”88 the press also demonstrated how Japan lay at the mercy of boycotts 
of Japanese goods by China, Japan’s most important export market. In 1919, when Japan had 
its right to inherit Germany’s sphere of influence in China recognized in Versailles, student 
protests and worker strikes broke out in Beijing and Shanghai, followed by a nationwide 
boycott of Japanese merchandise. Known as the May Fourth Movement, the demonstrations 
and boycott impressed the Germania enough to attribute a local Japanese withdrawal to the 
movement’s damage to Japan.89 As to be expected, the Manchurian Incident triggered 
another wave of refusals to buy Japanese. The Vossische Zeitung detailed that Japan’s 
exports to China shrank to 60 per cent of the previous volume and saw Japan’s retreat from 
the gold standard as part of the fallout.90 Another commentator noted that while in the short 
term Japan effortlessly captured city after city in China, in the long run time worked for 
China, “Japan’s most dangerous opponent.”91 The Vorwärts went so far as to praise the 
 
86 “Washington sanktionsbereit. Gemeinsamer Wirtschaftsdruck auf Japan” (Washington ready for 
sanctions. General economic pressure on Japan), VZ, 28 February 1932. 
 
87 “Japan als Wirtschaftsmacht. Kräfte und Ziele des japanischen Imperialismus” (Japan as economic 
power. Power and goals of Japanese imperialism), V, 3 February 1932; and “Der Krieg im Ferne Osten und die 
internationale Lage” (The war in the Far East and the international situation), RF, 3 February 1932. 
 
88 B. B., “Japan übernimmt sich” (Japan overextends itself), VZ, 19 January 1933, Evening Edition. 
 
89 “Wie das chinesische Volk die Japaner boykottiert” (How the Chinese boycott the Japanese), G, 2 
August 1919, Evening Edition. 
 
90 “China boykottiert Japan” (China boycotts Japan), VZ, 22 December 1931. 
 
91 „Der gefährlichste Gegner Japans ist –  C h i n a. Die Feststellung klingt gewagt in einem Zeitpunkt, 
wo die japanische Armee fast widerstandslos eine chinesische Stadt nach der andern besetzt… Aber die Zeit 
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boycott as beneficial to the growth of Chinese domestic manufacturing and a just economic 
weapon against Japanese bomber pilots.92 
To diversify its export destinations and reduce its dependence on China, Japan 
attempted to send its goods to other parts of Asia and Europe, an act the German press 
perceived as a threat to European economic hegemony. In 1921 the Vossische Zeitung 
detailed how industries in Thuringia had to compete with Japan, which had taken advantage 
of the wartime Allied blockade of Germany and penetrated markets previously dominated by 
Thuringian exports, particularly in the areas of toys, porcelains, and Christmas-tree 
decorations.93 Another realm of market competition between Germany and Japan occurred in 
the export of rayon. The Kreuz-Zeitung, noting “the fantastic development of the Japanese 
rayon industry,” asked its readers, “Is Japan spinning a web around us?”94 When Gandhi 
organized a boycott of British products in India, Japan stepped right in to satisfy the needs of 
“fellow Asians.” Two newspapers, however, described the event menacingly as “Japan 
conquering India.”95 
Although one cannot doubt that the Japanese economy attracted much coverage by 
the German press, attention alone does not equal automatic approval, and one can detect a 
 
arbeitet für China,“ in B.B., “Japan übernimmt sich” (Japan overextends itself), VZ, 19 January 1933, Evening 
Edition. 
 
92 “Chinas Boykott gegen Japan. Wirtschaftliche Waffen gegen Bombenflieger” (China’s boycott 
against Japan. Economic weapon against bomber pilots), V, 3 November 1931. 
 
93 Dr. W. H. Edwards, “Thüringen und Japan” (Thuringia and Japan), VZ, 7 September 1921. 
 
94 “Spinnt uns Japan ein? Die phantastische Entwicklung der japanischen Kunstseideindustrie” (Is 
Japan spinning a web around us? The fantastic development of the Japanese rayon industry), KZ, 15 January 
1921. See also, “Japans Kunstseide-Konkurrenz” (Japan’s rayon competition), VZ, 27 February 1933, Evening 
Edition. 
 
95 “Japan erobert Indien. Die Wirkung von Gandhis Boykott-Parole” (Japan conquers India. The effect 
of Gandhi’s boycott rallying cry), VZ, 18 September 1931; and “Japans erobert Indien” (Japan conquers India), 
G, 12 March 1933. 
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whiff of resentment in the articles on Japan. This phenomenon understandably became 
visible whenever Germany entered into direct competition with Japan, which enjoyed 
allegedly unfair advantages of a depressed currency, longer working hours and low wages.96 
The correspondent who wrote on the expansion of Japanese shipping lamented that it was 
Europe’s tragic and senseless self-destruction during World War I and the disbandment of 
the German merchant fleet that opened the way for the upstart to penetrate into areas of 
previous European dominance.97 Nor did the papers ignore the social and diplomatic costs 
behind Japan’s growth and expansion. The Vossische Zeitung reminded its readers that Japan 
produced its competitively priced textiles by literally trapping girls in a labor system 
bordering on slavery. Should Japan fail to sustain its exports, “the distressful social situation 
of the Japanese industrial workers would degenerate further.”98 One writer even penned a 
short story, complete with a poem, to expose the despair of the factory girls – and all these 
criticisms from a pro-business newspaper.99 As Japan extended its economic activities into 
China, the press also noticed its growing dependence on and vulnerability to the Chinese 
market, ultimately contributing to the economically irrational adventure in Manchuria and 
resultant Chinese boycotts. In addition, the press harbored no illusion regarding Japan’s 
paranoiac arms buildup and its detrimental effects on the economy, an unnatural condition, as 
 
96 “Rückgang im Ostasien-Geschäft” (Downturn in Far Eastern transaction), VZ, 15 April 1933, 
Evening Edition. 
 
97 “Von der japanischen Schiffahrt” (From Japanese shipping), VZ, 7 January 1921. 
 
98 „Elend, wie die sozialen Bedingungen der japanischen Industrie-Arbeiter schon sind, würden sie sich 
noch wesentlich verschlechtern, wenn Japan die auswärtigen Absatzmärkte nicht halten und erweitern 
könnte,“ in Prof. Dr. Hermann Levy, “Japans Wirtschaftskampf. Verhängnisvolle Expansionspolitik” (Japan’s 
economic struggle. Disastrous expansion policy), VZ, 5 December 1931. 
 
99 Hermann Lint, “Kimono,” VZ, 14 January 1932, Evening Edition. One wonders whether the paper 
would criticize German businesses as harshly had they treated their employees as egregiously. 
29
one commentator saw it, reminiscent of the Kaiserreich’s on the eve of World War I.100 
Putting together these images of the Japanese economy in the German press, one gathers the 
impression that Japan’s finances teetered on the brink of disaster and stood one wrong move 
away from a total meltdown, a trap Japan attempted to escape by exporting aggressively and 
thereby hurting German interests. Thus one must conclude that the German press did not 
portray Japan as economically stable, let alone a potential ally. 
 
Japan as an Imperialist Power 
German newspapers across the political spectrum portrayed Japan as one among 
many imperialist powers. Already on 20 September 1931, two days after the outbreak of 
hostility in Manchuria, the Germania placed Japanese actions on the same level as America’s 
continental expansion, English overlordship in Egypt and French prerogatives in the 
Versailles Treaty.101 The Völkischer Beobachter likewise saw the Incident under the auspices 
of Anglo-French-Japanese friendship.102 The Marxist Vorwärts and Rote Fahne not
surprisingly portrayed the struggle as part of a global imperialistic war to subjugate peasants 
and workers. “Japanese policies against China,” proclaimed the socialist paper, “never 
followed the tune of racial feelings but clear imperialistic power politics.”103 Furthermore the 
paper attributed the helplessness of the League of Nations to the connivance of Japan with 
 
100 Erich von Salzmann, “Japans wirtschaftliche Lage” (Japan’s economic situation), VZ, 18 July 1921, 
Evening Edition. 
 
101 “Explosionsgefahr” (Danger of explosion), G, 20 September 1931. 
 
102 J. Frenck, “Die japanische Politik in China” (The Japanese policy in China), VB, 2 October 1931. 
 
103 „Japans Politik gegen China war nie ein Spiel auf den Saiten des Rassegefühls, sondern klare 
i m p e r i a l i s t i s c h e M a c h t p o l i t i k,“ in Peter Garwy, “Sturmzeichen im Fernen Osten. 
Imperialistischer Machtkampf um die Mandschurei” (Signs of storm in the Far East. Imperialist power struggle 
for Manchuria), V, 22 September 1931. 
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other powers – “the League of Nations was powerless because the great powers controlling it 
wanted it to be so.”104 The communist paper minced no words and denounced the League as 
the center of an organization of war criminals and the Manchurian Incident an imperialistic 
plot against Chinese communists.105 Interestingly enough, the Rote Fahne and Völkischer 
Beobachter found themselves speaking in unison to accuse France as the merchant of death 
shipping arms to Japan.106 
Yet words alone did not quite fulfill the newspapers’ wish to depict Japan as just one 
of several imperialist powers, so they deployed clever illustrations to convey their message. 
In December 1921, during talks among Japan, America, Britain and France in the 
Washington Naval Conference on disarmament, the Vossische Zeitung carried a cartoon to 
caricature the unwillingness of the powers to step forward for arms reduction. Labeled 
“Disarmament Conference: ‘You first, then I!’”, the drawing featured some soldiers to 
represent the participants, with each holding on to their dear weapons and volunteering the 
 
104 „Aber der Völkerbund war machtlos, weil die Großmächte die ihn beherrschen, es so gewollt 
haben,“ in “SAI. und IGB. gegen Japan. Und gegen das Versagen der Völkerbundsmächte” (SAI and IGB 
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respectively for Sozialistische Arbeiterinternationale (Socialist Workers International) and Internationale 
Gewerkschaftsbunde (International Federation of Unions). 
 
105 “Hände weg von den chinesischen Sowjets! Der Krieg um die Aufteilung Chinas. Die japanische 
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106 “Französische Kanonen für Japan” (French canons for Japan), RF, 26 January 1932; and Dr. T., 
“Frankreich ist Japans Waffenlieferant” (France is Japan’s weapon deliverer), VB, 13 February 1932. 
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man next to himself for disarmament (Figure 3).107 The soldier on the far left appeared 
Japanese, with the standard five-cornered star on his helmet and the hilt of his sword just 
visible below his belt. In this image the Japanese soldier represented just one of the powers, 
indistinguishable from the rest. 
An illustration in the Kreuz-Zeitung developed further still this theme of Japan as one 
of the heavily armed powers. In an article attacking Versailles’s restriction on the size and 
equipment of German armed forces when other powers armed themselves to the teeth, the 
author marshaled a visual aid to convey his message. The chart on the right showed how 
Germany lacked an air force while other nations freely developed military aviation (Figure 
4).108 The other charts highlighted Germany’s deprived conditions on land and at sea. Each 
chart included Japan’s state of armament alongside those of other powers as a point of 
reference. The illustrator certainly saw no “have-not” solidarity between Germany and Japan, 
which appeared as an enforcer of Versailles and the treaty systems despised by nationalistic 
Germans. 
 
107 Paul Simmel, “Abrüstungskonferenz: ,Erst Du, dann ich!’” (Disarmament conference: “you first, 
then I!”), VZ, 4 December 1921, Pictorial Supplement. 
 
108 Illustrations by D. L. D. in Major a. D. von Keiser, “Das nationale Deutschland und die 
Abrüstungskonferenz” (The national Germany and the disarmament conference), KZ, 7 December 1931. 
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While the Kreuz-Zeitung saw the League as stiflingly pacifistic, the Rote Fahne 
viewed it as menacingly militant, all the time maintaining that Japan constituted but one 
member of an imperialistic bloc. In a cartoon titled “The League of Nations at work,” a 
monstrous creature wearing the League’s hat rains down death and destruction on a city 
(Figure 5).109 Readers could not have missed the Japanese flag flying alongside those of 
America, France and Britain. In a drawing of the “Geneva Disarmament Swindle,” a monster 
representing the war industries of 
various nations basks in the sun (pun 
intended probably) of Japanese 
weapon contracts while slithering its 
way to China (Figure 6).110 Again 
Japan appeared as one of the  
 
109 “Der Völkerbund an der Arbeit” (The League of Nations at work), RF, 3 April 1932. 
 
110 Caption reads „Kriegsindustrie sonnt sich an den japanischen Aufträgen – Streikt gegen alle 
Kriegslieferungen!“ in untitled cartoon, RF, 26 February 1932. 
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imperialist powers conspiring to subjugate a 
peaceful people. 
In less controversial contexts the German 
press also depicted Japan alongside other powers. 
In 1932, after Gandhi successfully wrested some 
concessions from the British government, the 
Vorwärts carried a cartoon to celebrate his 
nonviolent approach to seek political changes. In 
the drawing a circle of uniformed officers 
surrounds in wonderment a half-naked, scrawny Gandhi, remarking, “Strange, that this teeny 
civilian represents some sort of power” (Figure 7).111 The Japanese officer, shorter than the 
others, takes his place as one power alongside the Italian, Russian, French, British and 
American. Finally, during the 1933 
London Economic Conference, the 
Völkischer Beobachter printed an 
image to mock the selfishness and 
helplessness of the powers in face of 
the global economic crisis (Figure 
8).112 As the patient “world 
economy” lies dying, Uncle Sam 
 
111 Caption reads, „Die Militärs: ,Merkwürdig, daß dieser winzige Zivilist eine Macht 
darstellt,’“ “Gandhi,” V, 5 January 1932. 
 
112 Caption reads, „R.F.: Er kann ruhig sterben, wenn ich nur mein Gold behalte,“ in M. _lnir, 
“Londoner Weltwirtschafts-Konferenz” (London World Economic Conference), VB, 21 June 1933. 
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argues with a man representing the French Republic. Tucked in the far right stands a figure 
depicting Japan, looking rather clueless and squinting through the indispensable horn-
rimmed glasses. 
There can remain no doubt that the 
German press portrayed Japan as just 
another imperialist power and not 
possessing qualities that might be sought in 
an ally. In addition, the cartoons mocking 
the disarmament and economic conferences 
deliberately set a distance between 
Germany and the other colonial empires by 
omitting a figure representing Germany and 
showing the powers’, including Japan’s, 
inability to handle the Depression and unfair suppression of Germany’s reasonable 
aspirations. 
 
Japan and the League of Nations 
In the period examined by far the most prominent news item on Japan revolved 
around the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent drawn-out deliberation in the League of 
Nations. From the numerous articles on Japan’s negotiation with the League one can see a 
Japan that was aggressive and dishonest – not exactly attractive qualities in a prospective ally. 
The press relentlessly attacked the League’s inability to rein in a belligerent Japan; 
from right to left the papers hurled harsh criticisms at the League. The Völkischer Beobachter 
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ridiculed the League’s “capitulation” in the face of Japanese action,113 while the Kreuz-
Zeitung called attention to the “helpless” state of the League’s council when Japan refused to 
halt its operation in Manchuria.114 Throughout October and November 1931 the more 
moderate Germania and Vossische Zeitung asked again and again if Japan would submit to 
the League’s authority. “Will Japan come around?” became almost a weekly headline.115 The 
answer always disappointed: “Japan does not yield,”116 or “Japan repudiates the council.”117 
Newspapers from the left showed even less patience with Japan’s ability to invade China 
while the League wrung its hands. The Vorwärts decried the League’s “withdrawal,”118 while 
the Rote Fahne accused the League of downright complicity in Manchuria by giving Japan 
virtual license.119 
To make a deeper impact with their messages, the papers relied on visual means to 
underline Japan’s truculence and the League’s helplessness. The Vorwärts deployed its artist 
most effectively to highlight Japan’s aggressiveness and threat to world peace. In a cartoon 
titled “Attention – Kid-nabbing!” a mother, personifying the League, naps while kidnappers, 
dressed as Japanese soldiers and complete with ninja daggers between their teeth, lay their  
 
113 “Die Kapitulation der Völkerbundes vor Japan” (The capitulation of the League of Nations before 
Japan), VB, 27-28 September 1931. 
 
114 “Der hilflose Völkerbundsrat” (The helpless League of Nations council), KZ, 24 September 1931. 
 
115 See for example, “Lenkt Japan ein?” (Will Japan come around), VZ, 9 November 1931, Evening 
Edition. 
 
116 “Japan gibt nicht nach” (Japan does not yield), G, 13 October 1931. 
 
117 “Japan lehnt den Rat ab” (Japan repudiates the council), VZ, 11 October 1931. 
 
118 “Rückzug des Völkerbundes” (Withdrawal of the League of Nations), V, 26 September 1931. 
 
119 “Imperialistisches Banditentum in Genf” (Imperialist banditry in Geneva), RF, 20 October 1931. 
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hands on an innocent baby 
representing peace (Figure 9).120 The 
caption warned, “Nations, beware! 
The child kidnappers are at work 
again!” An illustration by the Rote 
Fahne emphasized Japan’s 
aggressiveness, abetted by the 
League’s timidity. Labeled “The 
Japanese Pacemaker of the League of 
Nations,” the cartoon portrayed a giant of a Japanese with a bayonet making great strides and 
leaving behind League commission members armed only with folders (Figure 10).121 As if 
the League could not appear any more useless in the face of Japanese bullying, the  
Völkischer Beobachter shared its own interpretation of the situation. In a cartoon titled 
“Nothing Learned,” a 
portly Chinese man 
tries vainly to thwart 
the bayonet thrust of a 
Japanese soldier by 
threatening to complain 
to Geneva, “Hold on! Or I’ll to tell the League of Nations!!” (Figure 11).122 
120 Caption reads „Völker, aufgepaßt! Wieder sind die Kindesräuber am Werk!“ in “Achtung – 
Kindesraub!” (Attention – Kid-nabbing!), V, 19 May 1932. 
 
121 Caption reads „Karikatur auf die Genfer Mandschurei-Kommission,“ in “Der japanische 
Schrittmacher des Völkerbunds” (The Japanese pacemaker of the League of Nations), RF, 27 March 1932. 
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Besides depicting Japan as an 
aggressor, the papers portrayed Japan 
as a liar in the Manchurian affair and 
its interaction with the League. The 
Japanese government insisted that 
the “incident” did not constitute a 
war, since that would mean Japan 
had violated the Nine-Power Treaty 
preserving China’s territorial integrity and the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war. To show 
the hollowness of Japan’s claim, a Völkischer Beobachter reporter first detailed an offensive 
by Japan and then annotated a press release by the Japanese war minister, “The Japanese War 
Ministry proclaimed that it would be a great error to think that Japan was waging a war in 
China. (A good ‘joke.’) Japan’s action in Manchuria amounted solely to purely policing 
measures (!!).”123 One may find it remarkable that the Nazi paper refrained from using racist 
terms or logic to criticize Japan’s action or explain China’s weakness, thereby indicating a 
lack of predilection for either people. The Kreuz-Zeitung, while criticizing the League for 
allowing itself to be duped by Japan, sarcastically agreed that Manchuria could indeed be 
truly independent, that is, from China but not Japan!124 Likewise the Germania always used 
 
122 Caption reads „China zu Japan: ,Warte Du! Ich sag’s dem Völkerbund!!’“ in M. _lnir, “Nichts 
gelernt” (Nothing learned), VB, 6 January 1933. 
 
123 „Der japanische Kriegsminister erklärte, es sei ein  g r o ß e r  I r r t u m, zu denken, daß Japan 
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124 “Der Völkerbund läßt sich dupieren” (The League of Nations allows itself to be duped), KZ, 18 
February 1932; and “Unabhängigkeitserklärung der Mandschurei” (Independence declaration of Manchuria), 
KZ, 18 February 1932. 
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quotation marks when mentioning “independent” Manchuria.125 Meanwhile the Vossische 
Zeitung grew sick of the platitudes Japan was force-feeding the League, blasting the 
explanation given by the Japanese delegate as “the most contorted, sorry and helpless 
blabbering” that one had yet heard in the hall of the League council.126 When Japan 
announced in March 1933, after its own withdrawal from the League, that it would form a 
competing organization for Asian nations, the Vossische Zeitung pointed out that only 
Japanese and one Manchukuo representative attended the event, which dodged issues like the 
role of China, even though plenty of government bigwigs appeared for propaganda 
purposes.127 Lastly, the two leftist papers spared no feelings and called Japanese answers to 
other nations for what they were – hypocrisy.128 
To hammer home the message of a dishonest Japan, the papers again deployed 
images. In February 1932 the Vorwärts printed a cartoon titled “Summit of Pacifism,” in 
which the Japanese representative to Geneva waxes eloquent to other bored members, “The 
best proof that we are not waging a war is the fact that our bomb raids engage only peaceful 
civilians” (Figure 12).129 Against the background of bombs exploding amid Chinese men,  
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128 “Heuchelei der Japaner in Genf. Leere Versprechungen – der Krieg geht weiter” (Japanese 
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Soviet Union), RF, 22 March 1932. 
 
129 Caption reads „Der  j a p a n i s c h e  V e r t r e t e r  beim Völkerbund: ‚Der beste Beweis dafür, 
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Z i v i l b e v ö l k e r u n g treffen,’“ in “Gipfel der Friedfertigkeit” (Summit of pacifism), V, 3 February 1932. 
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women and children incapable of 
returning fire (hence no war), the 
representative’s explanation rang 
hollow. Another cartoon in the 
Vorwärts mocked Japan’s dishonesty 
in its interaction with the League of 
Nations. The caption explained, “In 
Geneva it is declared: ‘The Japanese 
troops are engaged nonstop in 
clearing out of Manchuria’” (Figure 13).130 In the drawing Japanese soldiers are indeed 
clearing out the possessions of Chinese peasants in a campaign of pillage. The Rote Fahne 
too printed a cartoon to show how Japan would dupe the commission to be sent by the 
League to investigate the situation in 
Manchuria. Titled “The ‘State of 
Peace,’” the drawing depicted a 
commissioner encountering some 
Japanese soldiers transporting an 
oversized cannon (Figure 14).131 The 
commissioner asked naively, “Where 
are you heading [with the cannon]? I 
 
130 Caption reads „Die japanischen Truppen sind unausgesetzt mit der  R ä u m u n g  der Mandschurei 
beschäftigt,“ in “In Genf wird erklärt:” (In Geneva it is declared:), V, 5 November 1931. 
 
131 Caption reads „Mitglied der Mandschurei-Kommission: ,Nanu, wo fahrt ihr denn hin? Ich denke, 
der Krieg ist aus...’ ‚Klar, Mensch! Wir fahren ja auch nur ein bißchen nach Wladiwostok auf Spatzenjagd!“ in 
“Der ‘Friedenszustand’” (The “state of peace”), RF, 10 April 1932. 
40
thought the war is over…” The soldiers answered, “Yes, sir, we are just heading to 
Vladivostok for a little sparrow hunt!” Not only did the cartoonist want to show Japan’s 
duplicity and the League’s credulousness, he also wanted to convey the message that Japan’s 
aggression in Manchuria threatened the 
Soviet Union. 
Indeed unforgiving hostility to the 
League stood out as a recurrent theme in 
Weimar newspapers, and Japan’s action in 
Manchuria merely confirmed what the press 
knew all along about the League. On the 
one hand nationalists despised Geneva as 
the enforcer of the Versailles Diktat and 
administrator of territories like Danzig and 
Saarland. While the League bullied a disarmed Germany not capable threatening anyone, in 
the face of real aggression from Japan it retreated with its tail between its legs. On the other 
hand Marxists resented the League for not granting Soviet membership at first and 
perpetuating colonial rule in the Middle East and Africa in the mandate system. Japanese 
impunity in Manchuria merely showcased the collusion among the imperialist powers 
controlling the League. Just as the reporting of Japanese athletic achievements served to 
highlight German failures, the real focus of press coverage of Japan’s interactions with the 
League lay with German resentment toward Geneva, which the papers ideologically 
interpreted as either a hypocritical defender of pacifism or aggressive enforcer of colonialism. 
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As we have seen, although the press seemed interested in Japanese sportsmen and 
geisha, they also indulged in the notion of Japan as part a mysterious Asia with 
incomprehensible politics and a problematic economy that seemed to head from one crisis to 
another. Moreover, the papers depicted Japan as just one in an imperialist bloc to which a 
truly “have-not” Germany did not belong. Lastly, the press’s negative reactions to Japanese 
aggression and dishonesty can hardly support the claim that Japan and Germany were some 
sort of predestined allies. 
CHAPTER IV 
GERMANY IN FINE PRINT 
Overall the Japanese press presented Germany through a kaleidoscopic image ranging 
from a serious analysis of the Weimar constitution to a casual discussion of the musical merit 
of the anthem Deutschland über Alles (Germany over everything).132 Yet recurring topics 
emerged out of this eclectic mosaic to highlight certain aspects: admiration of Germany’s ex-
monarch, culture, science and economy, a perception of Germany as part of the West, and 
concern over German territorial claims in the Pacific, Nazi book-burning and anti-Semitic 
measures. 
 
Royal Treatment 
A strong interest in the ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II marked reports on Germany. As soon as 
the Great War ended the newspapers began to fear that the Allies were contemplating trying 
Wilhelm for war crimes. Thus the Yomiuri praised the Netherlands for providing refuge to 
the Kaiser and rejecting the Allied demand for extradition. The paper warned against setting 
a precedent of trying a “sacrosanct sovereign,”133 and cited the “fierce opposition” of the 
 
132 Nakura Bun’ichi ????, “Doitsu no shinkenpZ”?????? (Germany’s new constitution), 
Tokyo Asahi Shinbun, 24-29 August 1920, hereafter Asahi; and “Kaikin ni natta doitsu no kokka” ?????
??????? (Germany’s legalized national anthem), Yomiuri, 27 July 1926. 
 
133 ?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????, in “Dokutei hikiwatashi mondai (oranda no kyozetsu 
seitZ)” ??????(???????) (The problem of extraditing the Kaiser [Holland’s refusal correct]), 
Yomiuri, 28 January 1920. 
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TaishZ Emperor to holding Wilhelm responsible.134 Japan had high stakes in the debate: if 
the Kaiser could be tried for Germany’s actions, then Japan, with a constitution based on the 
Kaiserreich’s, might one day face the same charges.135 Despite revelation of Wilhelm’s old 
letters urging the Russian Czar to snatch Korea, the Kaiser in the 1920s and 30s enjoyed 
royal treatment by Japanese newspapers, which meticulously reported his minor ailments or 
remarriage as newsworthy. Moreover, the press repeatedly exaggerated the chance of his 
return to Germany to reclaim his throne, an expectation raised further still by the rise of 
monarchists such as Paul von Hindenburg and Franz von Papen. When von Papen as 
chancellor took over the Prussian government in a coup, the Nichinichi (??) even fancied 
that the ex-crown prince would become Germany’s president.136 Likewise the press 
interpreted Nazism in terms of monarchical restoration and called Hitler “head of a 
restoration faction” after his failed putsch.137 Despite Hitler’s proclamations of his plan to 
remake Germany into something hitherto unseen, the papers kept imagining Nazism as 
restorationist. Instead of seeing the crown prince’s membership in the Nazi Party as 
submission to Hitler’s appeal, the Kokumin rationalized that this royal-Nazi link could only 
 
134 ????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????, in “Nihon 
kZtei no hantai zendokutei hikiwatashi mondai to kakkoku” ??????? ?????????? (The 
emperor’s opposition. The problem of extraditing the ex-Kaiser and various nations), Yomiuri, 28 January 1920. 
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?????????????????????, in “KZwa shinsZ (8) dokutei shobun mondai” ????
(?)?????? (The true story of making peace VIII: the problem of punishing the Kaiser), Yomiuri, 9 July 
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humanitarianism (????????????????????????????), in “Zendokutei 
shinmon no keishiki” ???????? (The format for trying the ex-Kaiser), Kokumin Shinbun, 21 January 
1920. Hereafter Kokumin.
136 Nichinichi editorial translated as “Party or Despotic Government,” The Japan Times and Mail, 15 
September 1932. Hereafter Japan Times. The Nichinichi was the Tokyo counterpart of the Osaka Mainichi.
137 “Fukuhekiha kyotZ taiho” ??????? (Capture of head of restoration faction), Asahi, 11 
November 1923. 
44
facilitate the Kaiser’s return to power.138 Perhaps something novel about a monarch’s 
restoration touched Japanese reporters, but their myopic magnification of Wilhelm’s 
importance distorted their grasp of German politics. Not only did the press see republican 
Germany in the shadow of the Kaiser, it also assumed that the rightist Nazi Party would 
automatically support restoration. 
 
Profound Culture 
Besides its ex-monarch Germany attracted the newspapers’ interest in its culture. 
Soon after World War I a critic predicted in the Yomiuri that German culture’s “deep thought 
and strong emotions” would propel it back to the core of world culture.139 He also published 
a series in the Kokumin to compare German literature before and after the war.140 The Asahi 
meanwhile discussed culture by reviewing films by the German studio UFA and a dramatic 
rendition of Gerhart Hauptmann’s Vor Sonnenaufgang.141 For the centennial of Goethe’s 
death, the Asahi, Yomiuri, and Japan Times all paid tribute for days to the literary giant.142 In 
 
138 ?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????, in Gorai KinzZ????, “Dokutei 
futatabi kaeru ka –doitsu no fukuheki ni tsuite–” ?????????????????? (The Kaiser 
coming back? On restoration in Germany), Kokumin, 17 March 1933. 
 
139??????????????????????... ??????????????????
????????????, in Yamagishi Mitsunobu????, “Doitsu bunka no shZrai” ???????
(The future of German culture), Yomiuri, 17 September 1919. 
 
140 Yamagishi Mitsunobu, “Senzen sengo no doitsu bungaku” ????????? (Pre- and postwar 
German literature), Kokumin, 17-19 November 1920. 
 
141 See for example, Kayano ShZshZ????, “Hauputoman sono sakuhin ni tsuite” ??????
???????? (On a work by Hauptmann), Asahi, 15 November 1932; “Shin’eigahyZ ‘aikokusha’ doku 
ufa eiga” ??????????????? (Review of ‘In the Secret Service’ by Germany’s UFA), Asahi, 3
March 1932. 
 
142 For example, see Okutsu Hikoshige????, “G`te no me g`te hyakunensai o kinen shite” ??
??? ??????????? (Goethe’s eyes, commemorating Goethe’s centennial), Asahi, 14-16 March 
1932. 
45
fact, the Asahi reported that on the day of the anniversary a Goethe festival took place in 
Tokyo featuring the German ambassador as keynote speaker and performances of Goethe’s 
works.143 
German music and scholarship too drew the attention of reporters. In addition to the 
aforementioned study of the anthem, the Asahi detailed in a long article the plight of German 
musicians during the Great Depression.144 The German language itself aroused so much 
interest that the front pages of papers frequently advertised German courses and books on 
topics such as lessons from Germany’s recovery, Hitlerism, and German economic 
theories.145 Japanese scholars welcomed German membership in the League of Nations not 
just because of its impact on peace but because it facilitated German research on Japan and 
academic exchange between the two nations.146 A Yomiuri report on Japan’s acceptance of 
German books as valid reparations payments in lieu of cash revealed most tellingly this 
admiration of German culture.147 One could hardly imagine France or Belgium allowing 
Germany to replace coal shipments with copies of Goethe’s Faust.
143 “Hyakunensai no ‘g`te no y^’” ????????????? (“Goethe’s night” commemorates his 
centennial), Asahi, 23 March 1932. 
 
144 Ishikawa Renji ????, “Doitsu gakudan no genjZ”???????? (Current state of 
German music), Asahi, 29 October 1932, Evening Edition. 
 
145 See for examples, advertisement, “Shin doitsugo kZza” ??????? (New German lecture), 
Asahi, 27 September 1927; advertisement, “Hittoraa to hittoraa undZ”????????????? (Hitler 
and Hitler movement), Yomiuri, 4 February 1933; and, advertisement, “Doitsu keizai shisZshi” ??????
? (History of German economic thoughts), Yomiuri, 10 February 1933. 
 
146 Kanokogi Kazunobu ?????, “Renmei shinjin doitsu no nihon bunka kenky^netsu” ????
???????????? (Japanese culture boom in new League member Germany), Yomiuri, 14 
September 1926. 
 
147 “BaishZkin no kawari ni doitsu kara shoseki o monbu naimu no ryZshZ te kotoshi wa rokuman 
senyo en hodo” ????????????????????? ?????????? (Books from 
Germany to replace reparations. Ministries of Education and Home Affairs received about 61,000 Yen’s worth), 
Yomiuri, 10 October 1926. 
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Sophisticated Science 
In addition to culture, German technology also attracted the attention of the press. 
The papers celebrated as sensations the visits of German Nobel physicist Albert Einstein and 
chemist Fritz Haber to Japan.148 When the airship Graf Zeppelin embarked on its 
circumnavigation of the globe in 1929, the press built up excitement for its arrival in Japan 
by educating the public on aviation and tracked every leg of the dirigible’s flight. German 
aviators who made their way to Japan, such as the aforementioned von Gronau, invariably 
received a hero’s welcome.149 The papers even held the German navy in high esteem despite 
its lackluster record in the Great War. Already in 1919 the Kokumin hailed German naval 
technology as “first rate.”150 Even in its reduced postwar state the German navy still intrigued 
reporters. The Japan Times detailed in two articles how Germany’s “pocket battleships” 
brilliantly complied with the Versailles Treaty and yet defied its intention to deny Germany a 
blue-water navy.151 The Kokumin went as far as to commend the German navy as “still the 
model of the world” from whose spirit Japan had much to learn – lofty praises indeed from a 
country with one of the world’s strongest navies in 1933.152 In everyday settings too the press 
exposed readers to German science, as drug makers like Bayer regularly advertised their 
 
148 “Dokugasu sen no sZsetsusha ha hakushi sanjy^ nichi ni raichZ”?????????????
???? (The originator of poison gas warfare, Dr. Haber, comes to Japan on the 30th), Yomiuri, 29 October 
1924. Haber went to Japan to visit the grave of his uncle, who served in Hakodate as the first German consul. 
 
149 See for example “Enrai no guronau ki kasumigaura ni anchakusu” ?????????????
?? (Gronau’s machine lands safely at kasumigaura), Asahi, 5 September 1932. For more on von Gronau, see 
footnote 56. 
 
150 ???????????????????, in “Dokukan bunpai ikan” ?????? (How to 
divide the German fleet), Kokumin, 4 November 1919. 
 
151 “Germany’s New Navy,” Japan Times, 4 March 1933, p. 8; and “The German Navy: New Pocket 
Battleship,” Japan Times, 1 April 1933. 
 
152 ???????????????????????????????????, in “Tsuyoi 
doitsu no shinkaigun izen sekai no mohan kaigun” ????????????????? (Germany’s 
powerful new navy, still the world’s model), Kokumin, 15 January 1933, Sunday Supplement. 
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products in the papers.153 Japanese trading houses peddling new panaceas without foreign 
connections often borrowed the names of German celebrities such as Erwin von Baelz (a 
physician for the Japanese royal family), Wilhelm II and Goethe to help boost sales.154 No 
doubt, the companies selling these wonder drugs invoked the “endorsements” by famous 
Germans to attempt to bestow respectability to their potions. 
 
Competitive Economy 
The German economy consistently made headlines in the papers, but reporters 
sometimes held mixed sentiments. Immediately after World War I Japanese correspondents 
deplored the everyday hardships suffered by ordinary Germans;155 one even penned a 
travelogue of his harrowing trip through the “hell of starvation” along the Rhine.156 As 
Germany’s economy rebounded, however, the papers’ sympathy hardened into alarm. 
Reports surfaced in the late 1920s of German economic penetration in Asia to exploit the 
void left by a boycott of Japanese goods and to expand trade with Manchuria, long treated by 
Japan as its sphere of influence.157 Ironically Germany, having lost in Versailles its 
 
153 See for example, advertisement, “Doitsu baierusei novaruginjZ”?????????????
(Piramidon pills, made by Germany’s Bayer), Asahi, 20 October 1932. 
 
154 See for example, advertisement, “Doitsu no furZchZjyuyaku de kekkaku to ichZbyZ ga naoru” ??
???????????????? (Using German youth-restoring drug to cure tuberculosis and intestinal 
diseases), Asahi, 25 June 1932. 
 
155 XYZ, “Dokujin no seikatsu” ????? (The livelihood of Germans), Asahi, 26 February 1920. 
 
156 Hayashi Hisao ???, “GakidZ meguri” ?????? (Concerning the hell of starvation), Asahi,
22-29 February 1924. In Buddhism, gakidZ, literally “place for starving ghosts,” is one of six hells to which 
souls of gluttonous individuals are consigned after death as punishment for their indulgent lifestyle. The writer’s 
choice of gakidZ to describe postwar German suffering might thus indicate that he deemed the hardship as at 
least somewhat deserved. 
 
157 “Doitsu semento ni nanshi nan’yZ shinsaru” ?????????????? (German cement 
invades south China and the Southern Seas), Yomiuri, 16 August 1928; and “Doitsu tai shi shZsen ni shinkeizai 
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extraterritorial rights in China, often became the favored partner for Chinese businesses. 
After the outbreak of the Depression, Germany alongside America and Europe reacted by 
hiking protectionist tariffs and stonewalling Japanese requests for lower import duties in 
international trade talks. The Japanese press thus saw Germany as part of a West threatening 
Japan’s vital interests in export. In protest the Asahi printed two cartoons to mock Western 
obstructions to free trade. In the first, drawn by the famous cartoonist Okamoto Ippei (??
??) in October 1932, Japanese exporters struggle to scale the wall of “rising tariffs” 
despite favorable exchange rates and export subsidies from the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry while Chancellor von Papen hides behind a 
protectionist wall with the rest of the West (Figure 15).158 
Seven months later the West remained unmoved as ever, 
and the Asahi devoted another drawing to show the folly 
of high tariffs. Again Germany behaves as one of the 
Western nations by trapping itself on its own island of 
high tariffs and thus stranding the ship of commerce 
(Figure 16).159 Whatever sympathy the press entertained 
for the German economy after World War I had long 
evaporated by the early 1930s. 
 
teikei o kibZ”???????????????? (Germany’s trade war with China to bring hope for new 
economic cooperation), Yomiuri, 24 September 1930. 
 
158 Okamoto Ippei, “Rikikobu ga tarin!” ???????! (Exertions are not enough!), Asahi, 15 
October 1932. 
 
159 Tsutsumi SamuzZ???, “Kanzei hikiage kyZsZ”?????? (Competition in raising tariffs), 
Asahi, 12 May 1933. In the cartoon the figure representing England piles more bricks on the wall labeled 
“Ottawa Conference,” which in the summer of 1932 resolved to raise tariffs for the British Empire. 
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Thus, despite general interest 
in German royalty, culture, science 
and economy, a palpable 
undercurrent lurked in the press 
against blind admiration of 
everything German. A writer who 
had lived in pre-1914 Germany said 
that he had seen it as its most 
arrogant and hailed the fall of the Kaiserreich as an “advance for humanity.”160 On Japan’s 
embrace of German culture, a Yomiuri editor expressed relief that World War I halted the 
flow of German know-how, since it freed Japanese scholars from the German legacy and 
forced them to blaze their own path.161 Even vaunted German medicine attracted critics. One 
Japanese medical professor complained that not only did ignorant patients waste money on 
Western drugs that were no better than domestic counterparts, but also Japanese doctors 
“blindly worshiped Germany.”162 Respect for Germany thus elicited some criticism from 
those who preferred a more independent Japan. 
 
160 ?????????????????, in Hirano Banri ????, “Doitsu no inshZ”?????
(An impression of Germany), Yomiuri, 9 September 1921. 
 
161 “Gakujutsu f^sa to hanpatsuriki” ???????? (Knowledge embargo and [Japan’s] 
resiliency), Yomiuri, 30 January 1920. 
 
162 ?????????????, in “ByZnin wa fumimayou baiyaku no konran jidai kokusanhin to 
gaikoku seihin no kZka kurabe” ???????????????????????????? (A 
confusing time for patients looking for drugs: comparing domestic products and foreign imports), Asahi, 8 May 
1933. 
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Germany as Part of the West 
The way the press attacked protectionism highlighted another aspect of Germany’s 
image in newspapers – as just part of a Euro-American West. The internationalist Akahata 
most effectively portrayed Germany as one part of the world through visual means. For the 
“International Antiwar Day” on 1 August 1931, the Akahata printed a leaflet showing a 
global proletariat revolution that drove international capitalists into scrambling for their lives. 
The drawing depicted the German communist party as only one of the world’s many 
communist movements; in fact the communist parties from Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan 
occupied more prominent places than that from Germany or any from Europe. On the 
capitalist side, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning was shown as just one of many plutocrats 
fleeing the rising Red tide alongside Herbert Hoover, Benito Mussolini and Chiang Kai-shek 
(Figure 17).163 
Another image, published after Germany’s creditor nations adopted a moratorium on 
debt payments in 1931, showed President von Hindenburg and other capitalists such as 
Hoover and British Prime Minister Ramsey McDonald struggling desperately to prop up a 
crumbling wall representing the “German bourgeoisie” and “capitalist system” with a pole 
labeled “moratorium” (Figure 18).164 
The less ideological papers also saw Germany’s connectedness to the rest of the 
Euro-American bloc. In the 1920s and 30s both the Asahi and Yomiuri wrote editorial after 
editorial on the impact of German domestic politics on Europe. They even celebrated 
elections with limited contemporary and historical import as turning points for European 
 
163 Special Supplement, Akahata, 1 August 1931. 
 
164 Untitled cartoon, Akahata, 12 August 1931. 
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Figure 17. Communist movements around the world rising to shield the Soviet Union from international 
capitalists. Brüning (??????) is seen dragging a cannon inconspicuously on the lower left, just on top of 
Mussolini. On the far right is Chiang, behind a fleeing Hoover with a cannon under his arm. 
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peace.165 With the rise of Nazism in 
1933, however, Germany emerged as 
the most pressing threat to Western 
stability. As Germany made more 
bombastic claims after Hitler came to 
power, the Japanese press began to 
realize the danger Germany posed. In 
a cartoon of the “European nursery,” 
Germany the problem child annoys France by bouncing on its security blanket “Rhineland,” 
keeps Britain and Austria wide awake, and gives Italy the chance to harass Yugoslavia 
(Figure 19).166 Despite its more threatening stance, Germany in the press still appeared as just 
one power, and a problematic one, in Europe that hardly seemed suitable to be a potential  
ally for Japan. 
At the same time Germany’s 
involvement in the League of 
Nations clashed with Japan’s 
ambitions in Asia. After the 
Manchurian Incident the League 
authorized a commission under Lord 
Lytton to investigate whether the  
 
165 “Rekishi o kurikaeshite doitsu sosenkyo no kekka” ?????????????????
(History repeating: result of German general election), Yomiuri, 10 December 1924. 
 
166 Okamoto Ippei, untitled cartoon, Asahi, 16 March 1933. Translated as “European Situation 
Growing Critical,” Japan Times, 17 March 1933. 
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struggle involved a genuine 
aspiration for Manchurian 
independence. The commission, 
including a German delegate, 
unanimously condemned Japan as 
the aggressor but recommended 
establishing an autonomous 
Manchuria under virtual Japanese 
control. Still unsatisfied, Japan 
announced its withdrawal from the 
League, an event the press celebrated 
as Japan’s assertion of itself in defiance of the West. The Asahi carried a cartoon, titled 
“Great Power Japan Leaving the 
Bath,” that shows an oversized Japan, 
personified by its   representative to 
the League Matsuoka, retreating 
from the “warm bath of the League” 
and leaving other Western nations, 
including Germany, shivering in the 
cold (Figure 20).167 To emphasize 
Japan’s autarkic independence from 
 
167 Caption reads ???????????????????????????????????
????????????????, in Okamoto Ippei, “Daikoku nihon datsuyu no zu” ???????? 
(Great power Japan leaving the bath), Asahi, 22 February 1933. 
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the world the paper printed a cartoon depicting a Japanese husband cooperating with his 
Manchurian wife to construct a “Manchurian-Japanese bloc” while ignoring the jealous gaze 
and threatened economic sanctions of “various countries,” which included an unmistakable 
mustached caricature of Hitler (Figure 21).168 Whatever relationship Germany had to the rest 
of Europe, the papers viewed Germany as a component of the Western chain constricting 
Japan’s expanding interests. 
 
Former German Pacific Possessions 
When Japan and Germany came into conflict over former German territories 
controlled by Japan, the press voiced its patriotism in unison. During World War I Japan as 
an Ally seized the German-held Marshall, Caroline and Mariana island groups in the Pacific. 
After the war Japan received a League mandate to administer these islands, but Japan’s 
withdrawal from the League in 1933 led some nationalistic Germans to question whether 
Japan could still hold the mandate. Japan tenaciously defended its right to the islands, but 
Germany scandalized world opinion by arguing at the London Economic Conference that it 
could best fulfill its reparations and debt obligations by regaining the productive capacity of 
its former colonies. 
The prospect of Germany demanding the return of its former possessions outraged the 
Japanese press. When certain American politicians suggested Japan relinquish its mandate 
should it leave the League, the Asahi derided such talk as “nonsense.”169 As the threatened 
 
168 Okamoto Ippei, “Shinsetai e no shiren” ??????? (Trying out a new home), Asahi, 23 
February 1933. 
 
169 “Nihon no inin tZjichi o doitsu e kaese beikokunai ibbu no guron” ?????????????
?? ???????? (Returning the Japanese mandate islands to Germany, nonsense from some in 
America), Asahi, 28 September 1932. 
55
withdrawal materialized the feud over the mandate also intensified. In March 1933 the 
Yomiuri agreed with the Imperial Navy that the islands belonged to Japan by right of its 
sacrifice in the Great War and not by the mandate, which merely confirmed Japanese 
administration.170 Other newspapers vociferously denied any legitimacy in Germany’s 
demands. The Osaka Asahi put down any potential German claim as “illegal and irrational” 
and argued that “there is no reason why Japan should entertain such German overtures 
whatever her real motives or intentions.”171 The 
Nichinichi regretted Germany’s “poor diplomacy” 
in sending “absurd” feelers for talks over the 
islands,172 and even hinted sinisterly that “Japan 
should be prepared for the possible worst to 
come… for justice is not always upheld by 
everybody.”173 Mobilizing more altruistic ideals, 
the HIchi Shinbun (????) argued that 
Japanese control of the islands would only 
safeguard peace and open sea lanes in the Pacific 
and the East China Sea.174 
170 “Nan’yZ inin tZjichi no mondai” ?????????? (The problem of the South Sea island 
mandate), Yomiuri, 30 March 1933. Translated as “South Sea Islands Under Japanese Mandate,” Japan Times,
31 March 1933. 
 
171 Translation of Osaka Asahi editorial, “Japan’s Mandates,” Japan Times, 28 March 1933. 
 
172 Translation of Nichinichi editorial, “Japan’s Mandates and Germany,” Japan Times, 28 March 1933. 
 
173 Translation of Nichinichi editorial, “Mandate Problem,” Japan Times, 1 April 1933. 
 
174 Translation of HIchi editorial, “Mandate and Germany,” Japan Times, 2 April 1933. The HIchi 
reigned as the most popular newspaper in Tokyo at the end of the Meiji era. After the Great Kanto Earthquake 
in 1923 the Nichinichi and Asahi slowly eroded support for the HIchi.
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As the controversy raged on, 
the papers pressed into service even 
more original and graphic rationales 
to justify Japan’s claim, though the 
theme remained that Germany 
harbored no legitimate grievance. 
The Asahi cartoonist Okamoto 
devoted three drawings to the cause, 
each arguing for Japan’s rightful 
ownership of the islands for a different reason. In the first, a drooling Hitler, backed 
ominously by the West, looks longingly at a blooming tree representing the disputed islands 
that a sullen gardener personifying Japan has nurtured with authority from the mandate 
(Figure 22).175 The message rang loud and clear: Japan had taken the pain to cultivate the 
islands and now the West coveted the harvest. The cartoon thus set aside the issue of legal 
ownership and deplored Germany for immorality in trying to steal the fruits of another 
country. The second cartoon, in which Hitler urges his underlings to harass a lady 
representing Japan while leaving himself out of the fray, developed the theme of 
righteousness further still. She complains about the “annoying” little Nazis and chides them 
for lacking “propriety” in laying their hands on the bananas representing the islands (Figure  
 
175 Okamoto Ippei, untitled cartoon, Asahi, 26 March 1933. A similar but indirect justification of 
Japan’s continued possession of the islands can be seen in a report in the Kokumin that gives a detailed account 
of how the islands prospered under Japanese management. See “Inin tZji irai no nan’yZ no keizai hattatsu nihon 
ni totte minami no seimeisen” ????????????????????????? (The economic 
development of the South Seas Islands since the mandate, a southern lifeline for Japan), Kokumin, 31 March 
1933. 
57
23).176 The third cartoon shows 
Hitler selfishly preventing other 
powers from getting together to 
tackle the Depression by passing 
obnoxious gas symbolizing 
Germany’s demand for former 
colonies (Figure 24).177 Thus the 
paper now phrased the debate in 
terms of international cooperation rather than Japan’s selfish interests in holding on to the 
islands. Even the Kokumin, normally supportive of nationalism, felt compelled to warn other 
nations controlling former German colonies to be on guard against rising German 
nationalism.178 Preponderant evidence from the press indicates that Japan saw no need to 
sacrifice its own interests to accommodate Germany. 
 
Nazi Book-burning 
The Nazi regime’s limit on freedom of the press – a frontal assault on the journalistic 
profession – and the burning of books elicited a chorus of criticisms from the papers. The 
Yomiuri reported that after the Reichstag fire the Hitler regime seized the opportunity to shut 
 
176 Okamoto Ippei, “Hitorb te o hiku” ???????? (Hitler withdraws his hand), Asahi, 30 
March 1933. 
 
177 Caption reads???????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????, in Okamoto Ippei, “Okadochigai” ???
? (Calling at the wrong house), Asahi, 18 June 1933. It is interesting that in Figure 8 the Beobachter saw 
France as the selfish obstacle, while in Figure 24 the Asahi portrayed Germany as the roadblock to global 
economic recovery. 
178 ????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????, in “Doitsu daihyZ keizai kaigi ni ky^ryZdo kaifuku 
o mochidasu” ?????????????????? (German representative at economic conference 
presents demand for return of former territories), Kokumin, 18 June 1933, Evening Edition. 
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down the leftist press.179 While the Yomiuri rendered neutrally the Fire Decrees giving Hitler 
broad power as “emergency law,”180 the Asahi minced no words and denounced them as 
“martial law in essence” under a “police state.”181 Both the Asahi and Japan Times pointed 
out Nazi intimidation of foreign correspondents in Germany who filed unflattering stories. 
The former urged readers to pay attention to the regime’s suppression of journalists.182 The 
latter even published a commentary, cosigned by the editor and publisher, to denounce 
censorship under Hitler: “As night follows day, such censorship follows dictatorship… 
Under the censorship the German people will live in darkness… Germany, by the sweep of a 
pen held by one who has gained power by the meanest tricks of propaganda and mob 
organization, is left stripped of the fundamental human right to read and reason.”183 The 
denunciations of the press against thought control show that, whatever the politics of the 
individual newspapers, the professionals working in the press saw themselves first and 
foremost as journalists who understood firsthand the damaging effects of censorship. When 
 
179 “Saha kikanshi hakkZ teishi” ????????? (Publication of leftist papers terminated), 
Yomiuri, 1 March 1933. 
 
180 “Doitsu mizZy^ no kiki: kinky^ daitZryZrei happu” ?????????????????
(Unprecedented crisis in Germany, issuance of emergency law by the president), Yomiuri, 2 March 1933, 
Evening Edition. 
 
181 ????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????, in “Zendoitsu o tsutsumu: 
Kakumei irai no henchZ, jinmin hogorei (jitsushitsuteki kaigenrei) naru” ???????????????
????(??????)?? (Encircling all Germany, turning away from the revolution, implementing the 
people protection decree [martial law in essence]), Asahi, 1 March 1933. The “revolution” in question was that 
in 1918 that ushered in the Weimar Republic. The Japan Times also describes in conditions in Germany as 
under “virtually martial law” in “Drastic Measures to End Communism Taken by Germany,” Japan Times, 2
March 1933. 
 
182 “Reich Government out to Eradicate Communism in Toto,” Japan Times, 4 March 1933, and ???
??????????????????????????????????, in “Hitorb seifu kondo wa 
gaijin kishadan to shZtotsu” ????????????????? (And now the Hitler regime clashes with 
foreign press club), Asahi, 7 April 1933. 
 
183 “Hitler Censorship,” Japan Times, 11 March 1933. 
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they saw Germany sink into the darkness of information control, they rose up in one voice 
against the deplorable development. 
An even more shocking event, the torching of books, further alienated the newspapers. 
In May 1933 Germany began burning books deemed “indecent” or written by leftists or non-
Aryans. The Asahi lamented that the Germans, under the guise of “protecting German 
women,” incinerated irreplaceable works of erotic art, including a number from Tokugawa 
Japan.184 A few days later the paper ruefully compiled a list of “famous works” the Nazis 
“cremated,” including those by Karl Marx, Upton Sinclair and Erich Maria Remarque. The 
destruction of Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front in particular hit a sympathetic 
chord because the movie of his novel had caused a sensation in Japan for its realistic 
depiction of combat.185 Newspapers that had reviewed the movie favorably now had to report 
on Germans burning the book. While the bombastic Kokumin managed to call the book-
burning “daring,” it still regretted the fate of certain “great works,” especially All Quiet,
which was “also victimized.”186 The descriptive, personifying phrases chosen by these papers, 
like “cremated” and “victimized,” denote the importance the papers attached to the books and 
revealed their shock at the Nazi outrage. 
The wider Japanese society saw Nazi book-burning in an equally negative light, and 
the press made a point to publicize actions by individuals and groups to voice their 
 
184 ????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????, in “‘Dokukoku no 
onna o mamore’ sei no hon ya e o issZ”????????????????? (“Protecting German 
women”: sweeping away erotic books and pictures), Asahi, 7 May 1933. 
 
185 ????????????????????, in “Marukusu ya sei no shomotsu taigunsh^ no 
mae de kasZ”????????????????? (Marxist and erotic books cremated before huge 
crowds), Asahi, 12 May 1933. 
 
186 “Y^kanna funsho sekaiteki taisaku bossh^saru seibu sensen mo yaridama ni” ????????
?????????????? (Daring book-burning, great works in the world are confiscated, Western 
Front victimized also), Kokumin, 8 May 1933. 
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disapproval. A few days after the book-burning, the Asahi reported that prominent literati had 
formed a group to protest what the Asahi termed “destruction of culture” and what the 
Yomiuri decried as an “outrage against human culture” in Germany.187 The organizers 
intended to collect signatures on a letter to Hitler and expressed surprise that Japanese 
scholars acted ahead of their European and American colleagues to show their disgust.188 
Although the paper did not mention whether the scholars believed their letter would persuade 
the Führer to spare copies of Marx’s Das Kapital, Japanese intellectuals felt close enough to 
the German cultural scene to protest, and the press deemed academic opinions on Germany 
newsworthy enough to report. Once again the coverage shows that while the Japanese paid 
close attention to German culture, that focus did not necessarily translate into approval of 
Germany’s political actions. 
 
Anti-Semitism 
Nazi persecution of Jews confounded the Japanese, though the papers’ protests lacked 
the unanimity shown in the dispute over the Pacific islands or the criticism of book-burning. 
German Jews did not make news in Japan until their persecution by the Nazis,189 namely the 
 
187 “Jinrui bunka e no bZkyo nachisu ni dZdZ chZsen” ???????????????? (An 
open challenge to the Nazis for their outrage against human culture), Yomiuri, 3 June 1933. 
 
188 ????????????????????????????????????????
??????????, in “Waga bunrondanjin kara nachisu ni kZgi funsho wa ‘bunka no hakai’” ?????
??????????????????(Protest to the Nazis from our men of letters, book-burning is 
“destruction of culture”), Asahi, 14 May 1933. Later on the intellectuals, artists and thinkers joined leftist labor 
organizations to form an “alliance for freedom” (????), which demonstrated outside the German embassy 
when it hoisted the black-red-white imperial flag and sent a letter to the Japanese Ministry of Education and 
Culture to criticize the government’s silence in the face of Nazi barbarity. See “Nachisu e kZgibun, hoko o itten, 
monbushZ e” ??????????????? (Protest letter to the Nazis changes direction to the Ministry 
of Education), Asahi, 3 June 1933. 
 
189 In a Yomiuri article in 1928 the writer claimed that “the Jews prospered while Germany declined” 
(????????????). Other accusations against Jews sounded so similar to those leveled by radical 
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boycott against Jewish businesses in April 1933. The conservative Kokumin commended the 
action against Jews, whose “evil hands” supposedly played a role in Japan’s withdrawal from 
the League and its consequent isolation.190 A reporter for the same paper accepted at face 
value the regime’s excuse to boycott Jewish firms as “retaliation for Jewish boycotts against 
German goods” without asking why Jews needed to act against Germany in the first place.191 
The Yomiuri, meanwhile, switched over time from criticism to approval of anti-Semitic 
policies in Germany. As Einstein visited Japan in 1922, the paper recalled the attempt of 
Tohoku Imperial University to recruit the physicist, musing that Japanese could not 
understand anti-Jewish prejudice and implying that Tohoku should have succeeded since 
among Europeans the Germans were the most intolerant of Jews.192 In 1933, however, the 
paper sensationally warned that Jews had even infiltrated Japanese society, as manifested by 
the fact that Jews held the most shares in electric companies, bought the most government 
bonds, and controlled some public opinion through its control of the Japan Advertiser.193 
rightists in Europe that quite likely the Japanese writer simply copied them. In any case such a sensational 
statement would not be entirely out of line with the paper’s drive to reach readers outside the elites. See 
“Yudayajin mondai to sekai kakumei no nagare” ?????????????? (The Jewish problem and 
the flow of world revolution), Yomiuri, 22 August 1928. 
 
190 ??????????????????????????????????!… ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????, in 
“Zensekai ni an’yaku suru yudayajin no inbZ”??????????????? (The plot of the Jews who 
are actively scheming in the whole world), Kokumin, 23 February 1933. 
 
191 “Doitsu zendo ni watatte yudayajin boikotto” ???????????????? (Boycott 
against Jews across all Germany), Kokumin, 30 March 1933. 
 
192 ????????????????????????????????????…???
?????????????????????????????????????????????
??, in “KyZ kuru a hakushi ni nihon no ikan” ????????????? (Japan’s regret to Dr. Einstein, 
who arrives today), Yomiuri, 17 November 1922. 
 
193 ?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????…??????
???????????????????????????????????, in Nakata Shigeharu ??
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On the left side of the political spectrum the papers condemned Germany outright. 
The Asahi, never in any mood to condone anti-Semitism, printed a scathing commentary by 
its senior correspondent in Berlin. The author expressed utter incomprehension of the 
persecution of Jews and pointed out that only Germany, “a young civilization,” did not treat 
its Jews as social equals. He criticized Nazi “punctiliousness” for categorizing people as 
“half” and “quarter” Jews, and labeled Hitlerism “the other half of Metternich’s medieval 
regressivism.”194 When the Nazis harassed Jewish intellectuals and artists, the Asahi reported 
that Germany was now expelling some “maestros” in arts and literature.195 The persecution 
of scholars prompted the Yomiuri to lament the forced resignation of the Nobel chemist Fritz 
Haber, a converted Jew who was patriotic enough to oversee Germany’s gas warfare in a bid 
to win World War I and stoop to alchemy after the war to try to extract gold from seawater to 
help pay reparations.196 The Asahi deemed the persecution of Jews so utterly absurd that it 
printed a sarcastic cartoon showing a Storm Trooper arresting a Jew’s pet and turning it over 
to Hitler and a squad of overzealous Nazis, proclaiming, “Look! I got this damn one, it’s a  
 
??, “Doitsu o ch^shin to suru han’yudayajin undZ”???????????????? (An anti-Jewish 
movement centered on Germany), Yomiuri, 5 April 1933. 
 
194 ?????????????????????????????…??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????…????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????…?????????????????
?????????????????????????????, in Kuroda Reiji ????, “Haiyudaya 
shugi hitorb no buki” ????????????? (Anti-Semitism, Hitler’s weapon), Asahi, 2 April 1933. 
 
195 “Nachisu wa areru kanrin’in dan’atsu yudayakei kyoshZ oidashi” ?????????????
???????? (The Nazis run wild, repression of academics, dismissal of Jewish maestros), Asahi, 8 May 
1933. 
 
196 “NZberu jushZsha no ryZshi mo hisZna intai – hbberu kyZju to man shi” ???????????
???????????????? (The tragic resignation of two Nobel laureates, Professor [Fritz] Haber 
and [Thomas] Mann), Yomiuri, 5 May 1933. 
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cat owned by the Jews!” (Figure 
25).197 The Asahi did not merely 
speak out against anti-Semitism, in 
June 1933 it appealed to businesses 
and institutions of higher learning to 
hire Jewish scholars and scientists 
fleeing Germany.198 
As Nazi anti-Semitic 
measures turned increasingly stringent and violent, however, all newspapers showed less 
ambivalence in frowning on Germany’s actions. The Yomiuri attacked Nazi tactics as 
“terrorism” and reported that all German Jews lived in “terror.”199 Even the Kokumin 
complained that anti-Semitism was becoming increasingly “blatant,” as Germany barred 
Jews from the national tennis team.200 A Kokumin editorial advised that although the Jews 
might be a “tumor” (??) much like the Koreans pained Japan, Germany should leave the 
 
197 Caption reads ?????????????????????????, in Kishi Takeo???,
“Yudayajin hakugai” ?????? (Persecution of Jews), Asahi, 21 May 1933. 
 
198 “‘Shin’ai naru nihon yo doitsu gakusha no hone o hirohe’ y^meina yudayakei no gakusha kara 
hisZna sh^shoku undZ” ????????????????????????????????????
?? (“Dear Japan, gather the ashes of a German scholar,” a tragic movement to find employment from a 
famous Jewish scholar), Asahi, 29 June 1933. 
 
199 ???????????????????????????????????????, in 
“Hittorb shushZ iyoiyo dokusai e nachisu berurin daigaku o sh^geki, doitsu ni tero jidai” ?????????
???????????????????? (Chancellor Hitler increasingly dictatorial. Nazis attack 
Berlin university. Germany in age of terror), Yomiuri, 11 March 1933, Evening Edition; and “Zendoku no 
yudayajin kyZfu no ichinichi” ???????????? (A day of terror for all German Jews), Yomiuri, 2
April 1933. 
 
200 ?????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????, in “Yudayajin no shutsujZ o seishiki 
ni kinshi” ????????????? (Jews officially forbidden to participate [in Davis Cup]), Kokumin,
26 April 1933. 
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Jews alone, who “are by themselves unharmful, although they have power sufficient to resist 
undue oppression and to burst into revolutionary movements.”201 While anti-Semitism in and 
of itself did not incite protest from all Japanese papers, the brutality involved in Nazi 
repression of Jews aroused criticism from papers across the political spectrum. Moreover, at 
this point the Japanese press seemed not to have grasped the true nature of Nazi racism as 
targeting not only Jews but all non-Aryans, especially since thus far American discrimination 
against Japanese had exercised the newspapers far more than any perceived German racial 
arrogance.202 Indeed the press had cited German newspapers’ criticisms of the 1924 
Immigration Exclusion Act in the US as proof of a global outcry against American racism.203 
This fixation with American discrimination against Japanese probably also deflected the 
attention of journalists from examining closely Nazi racism against non-Aryans. 
As we have seen, the Japanese press did not portray a uniform image of Germany. 
Rather, the newspapers’ understandings of Germany appeared kaleidoscopic and shifting. 
Despite showing interest in various aspects of Germany, Japanese papers in the period did 
not depict Germany as a desirable potential ally. In fact, after the Great War when some 
 
201 “Doitsu no yudayajin haiseki” ????????? (Germany’s rejection of Jews), Kokumin, 30 
March 1933. Translation appeared as “Germany’s Exclusion of Jews,” Japan Times, 31 March 1933. Oddly 
enough, despite some of the inflammatory language, the author was trying to make the point that Japan should 
be generous in Manchuria to prevent insurrections. 
 
202 In the period surveyed the press mentioned German prejudice against colored races only once. In 
February 1933, as Germans debated the merits of hosting the 1936 Olympiad, some radical rightists argued that 
the Games should bar colored peoples from participating. The Asahi brushed aside such talks as marginal and 
comical, see “Doitsu kyokuy^ jin’ei no orimupikku haigeki y^shokujin jogai ni tobidasu chinron ippan wa isshZ
ni fusu” ???????????????????????????????????? (German 
extreme right camp attacks Olympiad by curious talks of excluding colored peoples, people mostly laugh it 
away), Asahi, 14 February 1933, Evening Edition. 
 
203 See “Doitsu shinbun mo beikoku kZgeki hainichi mondai de” ??????????????
(German press also attacks America for the problem of discrimination against Japanese), Yomiuri, 18 April 
1924; and “Osorerubeshi taiheiyZ no shZrai nichibei gaikZ wa masu ken’aku to doitsu shinbun no beikoku 
kZgeki” ??????????? ??????????????????? (Fearing for the future in 
the Pacific, Japanese-American diplomacy increasingly treacherous and the German press’s attack on America), 
Asahi, 20 April 1924, Evening Edition. 
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Westerners suggested that Japan, as the last holdout of militarism, imperialism and 
authoritarianism, would become a “second Germany” or “Germany in the East,” the Yomiuri 
strongly denounced such talks as “fantasy” and “biased.”204 Furthermore, when a Korean 
spread rumors in Rome of a Japanese-German-Russian alliance, the paper made a point to 
deny such an accusation.205
 
204 “Nihon wa daini no doitsu nariya (beijin no by^sZ)” ???????????(?????)
(Japan to become a second Germany [an American’s fantasy]), Yomiuri, 28 March 1920; and “Nihon wa tZhZ
no doitsu de iru tohZ mo nai shinbunZ no shokumegane ron” ??????????? ?????????
???? (Japan as Germany in the Orient, biased theory of a clueless newspaper tycoon), Yomiuri, 21 May 
1922. 
 
205 “NichidokurZ dZmei no setsu senjin no fumZ rZma o sawagasu” ??????? ???????
???? (Talk of Japanese-German-Russian alliance, Korean scandalizes Rome with false accusation), 
Yomiuri, 25 September 1919. Emphasis mine. 
CHAPTER V 
GERMAN MEANS OF DEPICTION 
The means through which the German press portrayed Japan can reveal just as much 
as the newspapers’ depictions of Japan, for they shed light on the thought and information 
filtering processes the papers used to make sense of events thousands of kilometers away. In 
general the Weimar press deployed three methods: familiarization through juxtaposition, 
ideological interpretation and visualization. 
 
Familiarization through Juxtaposition 
Journalists frequently juxtaposed a foreign concept next to a domestic one to bring 
faraway Japan closer home. Even simple juxtapositions could work effectively. Readers new 
to Japanese politics would find the SeiyJkai (???) comprehensible since the papers paired 
it with conservatives in Europe.206 Whereas few Germans would grasp the significance of 
Kasumigaseki (???) in Japan, by calling it “Tokyo’s Wilhelmstraße” the reporter handily 
conveyed the centrality that it had in Japanese foreign policymaking.207 Anticipating that 
readers might struggle to keep track of foreign cities like Harbin, Dairen and Fushun, writers 
searched for European counterparts to give the cities some individual identity. Thus Fushun 
became the Manchurian Cardiff, Dairen the Asian Karlsruhe, Schwerin or Breslau, and 
 
206 “Die japanischen Wahlen” (The Japanese elections), G, 23 February 1932. 
 
207 „...Kasumigaseki, der Wilhelmstraße Tokios,“ in Wilhelm Schulze, “Japan sieht 
Blokadegespenster” (Japan sees specter of blocade), VZ, 3 May 1933. 
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Harbin the “Paris of the East” or Chicago.208 One reporter found enough similarities to label 
Manchuria the “Asian Belgium.”209 Yet by juxtaposing Asian cities to European ones the 
authors also made a value judgment. For example, readers should admire Harbin as a melting 
pot like Chicago since its residents came from many different countries. By highlighting only 
the positive quality in the comparison, the author ignored the reality that Japanese lived in the 
city because they had just conquered it, a fact not so surprising since the writer held Japan in 
high regard. 
Facing the conundrum of the Manchurian Incident, the newspapers detected lessons 
from Europe that Asia could apply to resolve its problems. To help readers contextualize the 
entangled relationship between China and Japan, who as mentioned should supposedly 
behave as ethnic brethren, one commentator compared the Sino-Japanese struggle to those 
between Serbs and Bulgarians, Czechs and Poles, or communists and fascists.210 Another 
suggested that the Chinese, torn by internal strife, could look to the strengthening of post-
1871 Germany as incentive to unite against external threats.211 Noting the increasing 
influence wielded by the military in Japanese politics, the Vorwärts warned that Japan would 
suffer Germany’s fate as when Ludendorff triumphed over Bethmann-Hollweg.212 To this 
effect the paper also printed a cartoon, titled “The ‘Prussia of the East,’” to mock how the 
 
208 Joern Leo, “Mandschurische Schätze” (Manchurian treasures), VZ, 29 December 1931, Evening 
Edition; Wilhelm Schulze, “Drei mandschurische Städtebilder” (Portrayals of three Manchurian cities), VZ, 9 
April 1933; Wilhelm Schulze, “Auf heißem Boden in Asien. Charbin, das Zentrum der Nordmandschurei” (On 
hot ground in Asia. Charbin, the center of North Manchuria), VZ, 26 March 1933. 
 
209 Julius Elbau, “Mandschurische Feuerwehr” (Manchurian fire brigade), VZ, 15 November 1931. 
 
210 Richard Katz, “Granen im Osten” (Grains in the East), VZ, 31 October 1931, Evening Edition. 
 
211 Dr. A. Wirth, “Japan und Rußland” (Japan and Russia), KZ, 29 May 1932. 
 
212 “Japans Militarismus” (Japan’s militarism), V, 5 February 1932. 
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Japanese military could “in grand 
European fashion” demand the 
resignation of the war minister 
(Figure 26).213 The abovementioned 
pro-Japanese reporter reasoned that 
Japan’s difficulties in international 
relations lay not so much with the 
substance of its policies but with its 
bad reputation, much like Germany’s in the Great War due to hostile propaganda.214 Also in 
the context of World War I, the Rote Fahne warned that war mania in Japan in February 
1932 eerily resembled Germany’s in August 1914,215 while the Vorwärts saw Japan after the 
Manchurian Incident in the unenviable position of Austria-Hungary in 1914 – both advance 
and retreat carried enormous risks.216 One may find it significant though unsurprising that the 
papers interpreted current events using their ideologies to derive so-called lessons. Thus the 
anti-war Rote Fahne and Vorwärts saw the specters of Ludendorff, Austria-Hungary and 
World War I in East Asia in 1931-32. 
Conversely, journalists used juxtaposition to derive lessons from Asia for 
contemporary Europe. As border disputes broke out between Lithuania and Germany in 1932 
 
213 Caption reads „,Die Armee fordert den Rücktritt des Kriegsministers. Ist jetzt große europäische 
Mode!’“ in “Die ‘Preußen des Ostens’” (The ‘Prussia of the East’), V, 18 May 1932. It is unclear to what event 
the cartoonist was referring. The cartoon might well allude to the recent assassination of the Japanese prime 
minister by military cadets and junior officers on 15 May 1932, but the would-be putschists did not specifically 
demand the resignation of the army minister. 
 
214 Wilhelm Schulze, “Bürokratie in Fernost” (Bureaucracy in Far East), VZ, 30 April 1933. 
 
215 “Kriegsraserei in Tokio” (War mania in Tokyo), RF, 9 February 1932. 
 
216 “Japan in der Rolle Oesterreich-Ungarns 1914” (Japan in the role of Austria-Hungary, 1914), V, 13 
October 1931. 
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the Völkischer Beobachter wondered if East Prussia, already cut off from mainland Germany, 
would suffer the fate of a “German Manchuria.”217 The reporter fully appreciated the 
illegality of Japan’s severance of Manchuria from China, and that was exactly his point – any 
infringement of the integrity of East Prussia would violate international law. In 1933 the 
Beobachter conferred upon Austria the dishonor of “Europe’s Manchuria” – defenseless, 
impotent and reduced to a pawn of great powers.218 The lesson this time seemed obvious – a 
nation could either be armed or be strong-armed – fully in agreement with the Nazi Social 
Darwinist Weltanschauung. Also deploring Germany’s forcibly small arsenal, an officer 
contributing to the Kreuz-Zeitung detected a lesson for Germany from the poorly armed 
Chinese troops and their spirited defense against the Japanese: “a poorly equipped people can 
still defend its battlefield honor if they possess strong will.”219 Again, we should note that 
these purported lessons from Asia for Germany remained consistent with the papers’ existing 
ideology; no doubt the Beobachter would denounce any foreign designs on East Prussia with 
or without the Manchurian precedent. 
 
Ideological Reporting 
This ideological interpretation of news and filtering of information occurred even 
when no lessons needed to be gleaned. The Völkischer Beobachter demonstrated a 
remarkable ideological consistency in commenting on Japan. In 1923, after the Great Kanto 
 
217 “Litauens Spiel mit dem Feuer: Soll Ostpreußen die deutsche Mandschurei werden?” (Lithuania’s 
game with fire: Should East Prussia become the German Manchuria?), VB, 3 March 1932. 
 
218 “Opfer der Wehrlosigkeit: Oesterreich und die Mandschurei” (Victim of defenselessness: Austria 
and Manchuria), VB, 20 January 1933. 
 
219 „Wir Deutsche können aber aus den Vorgängen um Schanghai lernen, daß auch ein militärisch 
schwach gerüstetes Volk seine Waffenehre wahren kann, wenn es nur den festen Willen dazu hat,“ in 
Oberstleutnant a. D. Benary, “Die Streitkräfte Japans und Chinas” (The military powers of Japan and China), 
KZ, 29 February 1932. 
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Earthquake had flattened much of Tokyo, a reporter applied ruthless (rücksichtslos) Social 
Darwinist logic to make the case that other powers could use this chance to exploit Japan’s 
weakened state.220 When hostility broke out in Manchuria the Beobachter saw the war as a 
struggle between two races, reasoning that Japan’s overpopulation led it to expansion, an oft-
repeated Nazi argument for Lebensraum.221 The paper reasoned that the League’s weakness 
demonstrated that no country should ever rely on the hot air from “diplomats” for protection, 
but instead depend on tanks and warplanes.222 Finally, the paper warned that Germany would 
certainly suffer China’s fate as a plaything of foreign interests if it would not be led by Adolf 
Hitler.223 Alas, if only the Chinese had their own Führer!
This dictator did exist in the form of Chiang Kai-shek, alleged the other two 
ideological interpreters, the Rote 
Fahne and Vorwärts, but in a sense 
different from the Beobachter’s 
charismatic savior. Whereas the 
Nazis saw a dictator as solution, the 
two papers reviled Chiang as the 
cause of Chinese suffering. To this 
effect the Vorwärts carried a cartoon, 
labeled “In China,” in which a 
 
220 “Japans Not” (Japan’s need), VB, 15 September 1923. 
 
221 “Der Völkerkampf im Osten” (The racial struggle in the East), VB, 9 February 1932; and “Japan in 
China,” VB, 23 September 1931. 
 
222 “Japanische Neujahroffensive” (Japanese New Year offensive), VB, 31 December 1931. 
 
223 “Der Konflikt China-Japan” (The China-Japan conflict), VB, 19-21 March 1932. 
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starving and naked Chinese peasant explains to a threatening Japanese soldier, “You are too 
late. My own generals have already cleaned me out!” (Figure 27).224 Not to be outdone, the 
Rote Fahne published a poem by the cabaret composer Erich Weinert to mock Chiang.225 
And to wish its readers a merry 
Christmas, the paper printed a 
cartoon sardonically titled “…and 
Peace on Earth!” (Figure 28).226 In 
the illustration depressing scenes 
adorn a Christmas tree. The top left 
image showed canons thundering and 
people dying in Manchuria, while the 
top right featured a man about to be 
executed in Nanking. Overall the 
Marxist papers downplayed 
nationalities and grouped the 
Japanese imperialists together with the Chinese generalissimos as oppressors of peasants and 
workers. 
 
224 Caption reads „Der Chinese zum japanischen General: ,Sie kommen zu spät. Meine eigenen 
Generale haben mich bereits bis aufs Hemd ausgeplündert!’“ in “In China,” V, 24 September 1931. 
 
225 Erich Weinert, “Tschang Kai Schek” (Chiang Kai-shek), RF, 30 October 1931. A stanza runs as 
follows: 
 Nein, du erinnerst dich auch nicht mehr 
 An den kleinen, verhungerten Sekretär, 
 Der einst über seines Volks Revolte 
 Die reine Fahne des Sun Yat Sen entrollte 
 Und warf das Händlergeschmeiß in den Dreck! 
 Der trug deinen Namen – Tschang Kai Schek! 
 
226 “…und Friede auf Erden!” (...and peace on earth!), RF, 25 December 1931. The other images 
depicted workers laid off by the Borsig firm, political prisoners, state subsidies for the churches and the despair 
of the unemployed. 
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The more moderate papers too did not restrain from filtering news and information. 
The pro-military Kreuz-Zeitung saw the Chinese execution of a Japanese staff officer accused 
of spying as the fundamental cause of the Manchurian Incident.227 In the months afterwards it 
devoted pages to analyze the various equipment the Japanese army deployed. The pro-
business Vossische Zeitung understandably stressed the economic impact of the conflict in 
East Asia while trying its best not to offend either side to maintain business as usual. 
Immediately after the first shots in Manchuria the paper urged readers not to jump to partisan 
conclusions and declared that Germany only wished to trade with both sides.228 The paper 
understood Japan’s need to protect its substantial investment in Manchuria, yet it also agreed 
with China that Manchuria belonged to China.229 
Most intriguing of all, the Germania uttered pro-Japanese sentiments whenever a 
chance arose. In 1931 the paper printed a flowery eulogy for the ex-premier Hamaguchi 
Osachi (????), lamenting that in his death the world lost a great pacifist in the East.230 
Even after the outbreak of hostility in Manchuria, the paper still managed to put a positive 
spin to Japanese actions, citing the need for Japan to protect lives and properties from 
Chinese bandits.231 This Nipponophilia seemed strange, as Japan made no special 
accommodations to its Catholics or the Vatican, but some clues did seem to explain the 
paper’s stance. In September 1931 the paper reported that Japanese police raided an atheist 
 
227 “Kriegerischer Konflikt Japan-China” (Martial conflict between Japan and China), KZ, 19 
September 1931. 
 
228 “Japan besetzt Mukden” (Japan occupies Mukden), VZ, 20 September 1931. 
 
229 Dr. Sven von Müller, “Mandschurischer Film” (Manchurian film), VZ, 23 October 1931. 
 
230 “Hamaguchi-Osachi. Leben eines japanischen Staatsmannes” (Hamaguchi Osachi. Life of a 
Japanese statesman), G, 6 September 1931. 
 
231 “China boykottiert Japan. Japanische Maßnahmen zum Schutze von Leben und Eigentum” (China 
boycotts Japan. Japanese measures for protection of lives and properties), G, 9 October 1931. 
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group and apprehended some communists.232 During the Manchurian conflict the Germania 
mentioned that a French mission came under attack by “Chinese bandits” and thanked 
Japanese troops for exercising a stabilizing influence.233 Even more telling, in 1933 the paper 
carried an account on the state of a Christian mission in Manchuria, detailing how the 
Japanese military entrusted a Swiss Father with running the Red Cross there and how 
important a role the mission played in stemming Bolshevism.234 It also praised Japan’s 
“expanding campaign against attempts at social unrest” at home.235 These signs point to a 
religiously conservative newspaper that, paranoiac about the rise of communism and 
socialism in republican Germany, deeply appreciated the energetic actions taken by a 
regime – any regime – to defend religion and combat the spread of Bolshevism, and it 
interpreted news from that country through its ideological lenses.236 
Visualization 
As we have seen the papers also portrayed Japan through visual means, though the 
more businesslike Germania and Vossische Zeitung refrained from commenting on news 
with cartoons. As a result, the illustrations available to readers and to us stemmed mostly 
from the more politically extreme papers. Most frequently Japan appeared in the drawings as 
 
232 “Japan löst Gottlosenverbände auf” (Japan dissolves atheist groups), G, 8 September 1931. 
 
233 “Kriegsstimmung in Nanking. Banditen überfallen französische Mission in Mukden” (Decision for 
war in Nanking. Bandits assault French mission in Mukden), G, 7 October 1931. 
 
234 Prof. Dr. Aufhauser, “Die christliche Mission in der Mandschurei” (Christian mission in 
Manchuria), G, 2 February 1933. 
 
235 “Der Kommunismus in Japan. Wachsender Kampf gegen die socialen Umsturzversuche” 
(Communism in Japan. Expanding campaign against attempts at social unrest), G, 26 March 1933. 
 
236 In addition, German Catholics played a special role in Japan. The Jesuit order assigned Japan to 
German Jesuits as their area of missionary activities. For more on the relationship between the Catholic Church 
and Japan, see Hans Martin Krämer, Unterdrückung oder Integration? Die staatliche Behandlung der 
katholischen Kirche in Japan, 1932 bis 1945 (Marburg: Förderverein Marburger Japan-Reihe, 2002). 
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an armed and uniformed soldier (Figures 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14). This phenomenon 
certainly resulted partly from the fact that a military conflict catapulted Japan to the press’s 
attention; inevitably Japan would have to appear martial in such a context. In drawings in 
which Japan appeared next to the West, the character often stood head and shoulders below 
the Europeans (Figures 7 and 8). In two cartoons Japan appeared as a man squinting through 
horn-rimmed glasses (Figures 8 and 12). Germany did not have a monopoly of these images 
of the militarist, diminutive and nearsighted Japanese; American media relied heavily on 
such stereotypes in anti-Japanese propaganda before and during World War II.237 This 
pattern indicates that the German press did not invent any visual depictions of Japan and 
instead tapped into existent Western constructs, once again demonstrating that the 
newspapers did not make arrangements for Japan as a potential ally. 
 
237 See Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967); and John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1987). 
CHAPTER VI 
JAPANESE MEANS OF DEPICTION 
In addition to a mosaic image of Germany, the pattern of Japanese press reporting 
reveals three main approaches that the press used to make sense of developments in Germany: 
a trial-and-error learning process, ideological news interpretation and visualization. 
 
Learning Process 
As the reporting on Nazi anti-Semitism showed, the papers’ handling of German 
events did not remain static. Instead, their knowledge of Germany evolved with new 
developments and depended on the resources at the papers’ disposal. Immediately after 
World War I, Japanese reporters had to file stories on the ex-enemy Germany from other 
European countries. This likely meant that Japanese correspondents had to retranslate reports 
already rendered from German to another language. No doubt this process increased the 
chance for error and contributed to some of the misconceptions about Germany. Not until the 
early 1920s could a large paper like the Asahi afford its own correspondent in Berlin, 
improving markedly its quality and quantity of news items on Germany. Yet news is by 
definition unprecedented, and even the Asahi’s Germany watchers could not have 
immediately grasped the meaning of developments there. For example, the reporters’ 
obsession with the ex-Kaiser misled them into seeing every rightist movement, including 
Nazism, as restorationist. Only after passage of the Enabling Act in March 1933 guaranteeing 
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a Hitler dictatorship did the papers gradually stop suggesting the possibility of a return to 
monarchy. 
This learning process the press used to try to digest new information appeared most 
clearly in the verbal and visual representations the newspapers deployed to make sense of 
Hitler. Few in Germany, not to mention Japan, had ever heard of Hitler before his 1923 failed 
putsch. In its aftermath the Osaka Asahi reported the arrest of a certain “von Hitler” (???
??????, literally “Fon Hittorb”).238 In a German family name von denotes aristocratic 
lineage, yet there was nothing noble about Hitler. A contemporaneous article in the Yomiuri 
falsely promoted the former private-first-class Hitler to “General Hittoreru” (??????
?).239 The accepted transliteration of Hitler then became the more accurate “Hittorb” (??
???) until 1930, when reporters finally switched to “Hitorb” (????), the rendition 
still in use today. Yet the old spellings “Hittorb” and “Hittoreru” lingered on, and often two 
or more versions appeared in the same article. While this phenomenon 
may not convey any connotation outside orthography, it does suggest a 
refinement of the understanding of Hitler from ambiguity to clarity and 
consensus. 
The evolution in the visual representation of Hitler appears 
even more clearly. On 28 January 1933, the Asahi carried an article on 
rumors of a Hitler cabinet and attached an abstract drawing of Hitler 
 
238 Osaka Mainichi article reprinted in TaishI nyJsu jiten ???????? (The TaishZ news 
encyclopedia) (Tokyo: Mainichi Communications, 1988), 566. 
 
239 “Bavaria fukuheki tonza ka r^dendorufu hittoreru ryZshZgun ikedori saru” ?????????
?????????????????? (Restorationists defeated in Bavaria? Generals Ludendorff and 
Hitler captured alive), Yomiuri, 11 November 1923. 
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composed mainly of lines and blots of black (Figure 29).240 The abstraction likely stemmed 
from the uncertainty over whether Hitler would head a government, and, if he did, what 
policies he would pursue. On 22 March, one day before the assured passage of the Enabling  
Act giving the chancellor “absolute dictatorial authority,” the article 
reporting the news included an image of a grim-looking Hitler (Figure 
30).241 By this time, the Nazis had forced passage of the Reichstag Fire 
Decrees, silenced the socialists, beaten the communists out of 
existence and cowed the centrists into subservience. No doubt could 
remain over what further power to Hitler would bring to Germany, and 
the caricature of Hitler reflected the seriousness of the situation. Finally, on 18 June, when 
Germany dropped a bombshell at the London Economic Conference by demanding the return 
of its former colonies, the Asahi headline stood next to an 
unambiguously demonic portrayal of Hitler (Figure 31).242 By now the 
world had seen the German clamor for the Pacific islands, anti-Semitic 
boycott, book-burning, expulsion of Jewish scholars and suppression 
of all opposition. Small wonder the portrayal of Hitler turned decidedly 
negative. 
This evolution of the representation of Hitler shows that the 
Japanese press did not approach Hitler or Germany with a 
 
240 “Hitorb tsui ni dakyZ doku no seikyoku ittenkZ”??????????????? (Agreement 
with Hitler at last, a turnaround in German politics), Asahi, 28 January 1933, Evening Edition. 
 
241 “Hitorb dokushushZ zettai dokusaiken o yZky^: kenpZ mushi no kengen o fukumu” ??????
??????????????????? (German Chancellor Hitler demanding absolute dictatorial 
authority, including power to bypass constitution), Asahi, 22 March 1933, Evening Edition. 
 
242 “Ky^ryZdo no henkan o dokudaihyZ totsuyo yZky^”????????????? (German 
delegation suddenly demands return of former possessions), Asahi, 18 June 1933, Evening Edition. 
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predetermined positive or negative slant. Instead, it absorbed knowledge as events unfolded 
and refined its positions and reactions much as any news organ striving to be objective and 
unbiased should. Although the images studied here all come from the Asahi, even the 
Kokumin, as noted previously, could not give a positive spin to violent anti-Semitism, the 
destruction of literary masterpieces and revival of German ambitions in the Pacific. The 
Kokumin too came to realize that a Hitler dictatorship might threaten Japan’s security. 
 
Ideological Reporting 
The effects of ideology and politics on Japanese reporting on Germany also merit 
attention. While the newspapers at times adopted a similar stance on issues, they often 
diverged on the aspects they chose to emphasize. The most political paper of all, the Akahata,
filtered news liberally. On the occasion of the approval of the debt moratorium for Germany, 
the paper stressed that the German Communist Party opposed any payment, since the 
proletariat bore the cost of imperialist wars and the payments merely exploited what little the 
poor had to prop up the failing capitalist system.243 The Akahata, however, uttered not a word 
on the real headline news, namely the legitimization of Nazism through its cooperation with 
the Nationalists and other conservative groups to oppose all reparations.244 Yet it was the 
paper’s election coverage that revealed most clearly its filtering of news. For the election in 
July 1932, it printed the headline “The party of proletarian dictatorship garners 5.3 million 
 
243 ????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????, in “Doitsu ni okeru kaiky^ tZsZ
gekka” ????????????? (Intensification of class struggle in Germany), Akahata, 12 August 
1931. 
 
244 The Akahata explained that since the “bourgeois press” was not giving the KPD any coverage, the 
Japanese paper would have to take up the task: ??????????????????????????
??????????????????, in ibid. 
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votes!!”245 That the Nazis doubled their votes and became the largest party in the Reichstag 
was explained away as the result of “connivance of the von Papen cabinet, policies of bloody 
terrorism against communism and clever manipulation of xenophobia.”246 For the election in 
November 1932, the Akahata again dwelled on the gains of the KPD: “Votes for German 
Communist Party increased by 700,000,” while ignoring the real significant development that 
the Nazis lost two million votes.247 For the election in March 1933, when the Nazis obtained 
enough votes to form a majority coalition government, the Akahata celebrated the 
performance of the KPD in preserving 80 seats and reasoned that Hitler merely won votes 
from “various small parties, backward agitators from the worker camp and new petit 
bourgeois voters with no prior political self-awareness.”248 If one read only the Akahata, one
might believe that the KPD stood on the verge of some major electoral breakthrough before 
Hitler came to power and would make a comeback despite relentless suppression. Without 
fabricating any facts, a newspaper could create misleading impressions simply by shifting its 
emphasis. 
Perhaps we can excuse the sensational Akahata for its selective coverage, yet 
ideological tainting of news affected other less political papers. After all, the party organ 
preached only to the choir, as no non-communist would want to be caught with an issue of 
 
245 “Puroretaria dokusai no tZ ni atsumaru gohyaku sanjy^man hyZ!!” ?????????????
???????!! (The party of proletarian dictatorship collects 5.3 million votes!!), Akahata, 5 August 1932. 
 
246 ?????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????, in ibid. 
 
247 “Doitsu kyZsantZ tokuhyZ nanajy^man hyZ o zZdai” ?????????????? (Votes for 
German Communist Party increased by 700,000), Akahata, 15  November 1932. 
 
248 ??????(?????)??????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????, in “Daidan’atsu no doitsu 
kokkai senkyo ni giseki hachijy^ o mamoru!” ????????????????????! (Preserving 80 
parliamentary seats in German parliamentary election under large-scale repression!) , Akahata, 15 March 1933. 
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the illegal paper. The driving force behind the Kokumin, the nationalist Tokutomi, chided the 
Germans in 1920 for “the lack of a national essence” that led to internal feuds and their 
defeat in World War I.249 The same criticism of the Germans as given to infighting 
resurfaced in 1932, when an editorial called for the “iron and blood” of a “second Bismarck” 
to sweep aside splinter parties while another writer urged the Germans to come to their 
senses and see the need for a dictator.250 When that potential dictator’s party lost votes in 
November 1932, the Kokumin proved itself not above ideological partiality and copied the 
Akahata by rationalizing that Nazi electoral decline signaled a shift of voter support to other 
rightwing parties rather than the left.251 When the Nazis finally established a one-party 
dictatorship, the Kokumin commented that Hitler had cured the Germans of their “addiction 
to internecine conflicts.”252 The nationalistic Kokumin appeared quite consistent in its support 
for the nationalistic Nazi movement, at least until German expansionism potentially 
threatened Japanese interests in the Pacific. 
Even the two moderate papers, the Asahi and Yomiuri, clearly favored certain issues. 
The Yomiuri, retaining an interest in scholarship, noted what rising German nationalism 
 
249 Tokutomi SohZ, “Doitsu kokuminsei no kekkan” ???????? (Lack of German national 
essence), Kokumin, 26 March 1920. 
 
250 ?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????, in “Doitsu no sZsenkyo to tZhei bakurZ”??????????? (General elections 
in Germany and exposure of party evils), Kokumin, 20 September 1932; and ??????????????
????…???????????????????????????, in Gorai KinzZ, “HittorbtZ no 
bunretsu?” ?????????? (The Hitler party splitting?), Kokumin, 16 December 1932. 
 
251 ?????????????????????????????????????????
???????, in Gorai KinzZ, “Nankyoku ni tatsu hitorb”????????? (Hitler in a bind), Kokumin,
10 November 1932. 
 
252 ??????????????????????????????????????????
??, in “Doitsu no ikkoku ittZ shugi” ????????? (Germany’s one-nation, one-party ideology), 
Kokumin, 30 June 1933. 
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brought to schools and education. Responding to rumors that the German education ministry 
ordered school children to memorize the Versailles Treaty, the Yomiuri became concerned 
with the revival of militarism.253 The paper also made a point to report the re-legalization of 
student dueling, sarcastically calling it a “masterpiece” of Nazi legislation.254 Meanwhile the 
Asahi focused on the legal aspect of Nazism. After another indecisive election in November 
1932, it commented that prolonged deadlock meant the continued exercise of the presidential 
decree and that political instability in Germany deserved “regret and sympathy.”255 On the 
Fire Decrees, translated as “decree for the protection of people from the communist threat” 
(????????????), the Asahi explained that they contradicted Article 2 of the 
constitution ensuring the people’s freedoms.256 Even before the Enabling Act (“trust in 
government act,” ?????) granting Hitler “dictatorial authority” (?????), the 
paper had concluded that the abolition of the federal system and persecution of the republic’s 
supporters meant that the Weimar constitution, though never officially abandoned by the 
Nazis, was in effect not worth the paper it was printed on.257 Even German violation of 
 
253 “Gunkoku doitsu no saigen?” ???????? (Militarist Germany to re-emerge?), Yomiuri, 29 
January 1933. 
 
254 “Gakusei kettZ oyurushi nachisu hZreich^ no ‘kessaku’” ??????? ???????????
(Student dueling allowed, a ‘masterpiece’ of Nazi legislation), Yomiuri, 7 April 1933, Evening Edition. 
 
255 “Doitsu seikyoku fuan” ??????? (Instability in German politics), Asahi, 8 November 1933. 
Translated as “Political Instability Growing,” Japan Times, 9 November 1933. 
 
256 “Doitsu saiken yon’en keikaku to sayoku dan’atsusaku o suikZ hinaikaku, kokumin shiji no na no 
shita ni” ??????????????????????????????? (Germany launches four-
year plan for reconstruction and suppression of the left. Hitler cabinet acting under name of popular support), 
Asahi, 7 March 1933. 
 
257 “RenpZsei o haishite ch^Z sh^kensei hitorb seifu no ito” ???????????? ?????
???? (Abolition of federal system and centralizing authority, the Hitler government’s intention), Asahi, 11 
March 1933; “Hitorb itten kyZwaha dan’atsu bavaria no dantai no kinshi” ??????????? ????
??????? (Hitler turns to suppressing republicans, banning Bavarian groups), ibid., 12 March 1933; and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????,
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international law concerned the Asahi. When Storm Troopers crossed the Rhine to take over 
the municipal government of Cologne, it presented the act as noncompliance toward 
Versailles’s ban on German soldiers west of the Rhine.258 Considering that the troopers likely 
carried only clubs or pistols, the report reveals that the Asahi stretched its analysis and went 
out of its way to hold Germany responsible for any possible treaty violation. 
Looking at the events the newspapers chose to report, a trend emerged to show that 
the papers’ depiction of Germany differed according to the eyes of the beholder and that at 
least in part they saw a Germany that they wanted to see. The Akahata supported the German 
Communist Party not because of its German but its communist quality. Likewise the 
Kokumin saw something admirable in the National Socialist Party not for its Germanness but 
for its nationalism and authoritarianism. And the Yomiuri and Asahi both lamented the 
demise of the republic more because it represented the demise of democracy, liberalism and 
internationalism than some abstract notion of Germany. Ideology and politics mattered much 
more than any preconceived positive image of Germany, if indeed any existed. 
 
Visualization 
Lastly the Japanese papers deployed cartoons to help readers visualize their messages. 
Most noticeably, the illustrations discussed in this essay all used a prominent politician to 
represent Germany as a whole, such as von Papen in Figure 15, Brüning in Figure 17, von 
Hindenburg in Figure 18 and Hitler in the rest. This feature contrasts sharply with cartoons in 
 
in “Doku teisei jidai no kokki fukkatsu o hatsurei” ????????????? (Legislation to revive the 
German imperial flag), ibid., 13 March 1933, p. 2; and “Hitorb naikaku ‘seifu shinraihZ’ teishutsu” ?????
?????????? (Hitler cabinet proposes Enabling Act), Asahi, 17 March 1933. 
 
258 “Doku kokusui shakai tZin heiwa jZyaku o mushisu hibusZ chitai rain sagan ni shinny^”????
???????????????????????? (German Nazi Party members ignore peace treaty, 
enter demilitarized left bank of the Rhine), Asahi, 14 March 1933. 
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the German papers, which relied on stereotypical, nameless figures in uniforms or wearing 
horn-rimmed glasses to caricature Japan. The Japanese press appeared to know more about 
Germany than its German counterpart about Japan and it expected its readers to be 
conversant enough to recognize Hitler even if the image constituted only lines and blots of 
black. This gulf in mutual familiarity probably reflected the imbalanced interaction of 
knowledge and impact between Japan and Germany. Japan made liberal use of German 
innovation, and this technological flow remained a strong one-way current.259 Whereas a 
reversion of the Pacific islands to German control would drastically shrink Japan’s defensive 
perimeter, for Germany ownership or loss of the archipelagos translated to negligible 
material difference, as World War I amply demonstrated. In other words, the islands meant 
much more to Japan than to Germany, and it paid Japan to monitor closely German political 
developments. The prominence of individuals in the cartoons, particularly Hitler, mirrored 
the personal, charismatic nature of late Weimar politics. Despite the heavy attention paid to 
Hitler, Japanese caricatures showed him as misbehaving, drooling, passing gas and playing 
baseball (as will be seen shortly), indicating that the press did not reserve a favored place as 
predestined ally for the regime he would establish.
 
259 See KudZ Akira, Japanese-German Business Relations: Cooperation and Rivalry in the Inter-war 
Period (New York: Routledge 1998). 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Amid the flurry of alarming reports on the Enabling Act and the Pacific islands, a 
Japanese company apparently posed the question “What do you think of Hitler?” to potential 
employees to test their knowledge of current events. One uninformed candidate, undoubtedly 
an avid baseball fan, blurted out, “Hitler refers to a power hitter” (Figure 32).260 
Before making too much of 
the newspapers’ portrayals of the 
other country, we should keep in 
mind that the press constitutes only 
one piece in the jigsaw image of one 
country’s perception of another. 
Moreover, newspapers by nature 
present only one side of a dialogue. Without resources such as letters to the editor, scholars 
have to tread carefully to determine whether subscribers read what they bought and how they 
reacted. In order to paint a comprehensive picture of Japanese and German understandings of 
the other nation, historians need to research further using other reflective sources such as 
travelogues, letters and diaries of expatriates, and substantial works of intellectuals. 
 
260 Caption reads ???????????????????????????????????
??????????, in Yasumoto RyZichi ????, “MeitZ?” ??? (Right answer?), Asahi, 26 March 
1933. 
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Yet the unique role the press played in the pre-television age as the principal medium 
to inform people of events outside their locales makes an analysis of newspapers worthwhile 
and rewarding. This study of the images of Germany presented by the Japanese press reveals 
a kaleidoscopic picture. On the one hand Japanese admired Germany for its colorful ex-
monarch, profound culture, advanced science and competitive economy. On the other hand, 
an undercurrent of minority opinions surfaced occasionally to caution against unquestioned 
acceptance of everything German. The newspapers usually depicted Germany in a Euro-
American context, but with the rise of Nazism Germany began to stand out as a nation of 
expansionist ambitions that barbarically trampled on culture and human rights. The 
contradictions in the portrayals alone demonstrate that there existed no preconceived 
consensus about Germany in the Japanese press. Instead, the newspapers learned to refine 
their understanding of Germany and selectively reported ideologically agreeable news items 
while turning a blind eye to the others. The overall press images of Germany strongly 
indicate that pre-1933 Japan did not visualize Germany as a potential ally. Particularly in the 
first half of 1933, after the rise of Nazism and before the nearly complete erosion of Japanese 
liberalism, the press saw Germany in an overwhelmingly negative light. 
In Germany, the newspapers on the one hand admired Japanese athleticism and 
certain features of its culture (or what Westerners portrayed as Japanese tradition). On the 
other hand the press noticed Japan’s inscrutable domestic politics, highly unstable economy, 
suspicious status as an imperialist power aligned with the traditional empires, and capacity 
for aggression and duplicity – factors that certainly rendered it unsuitable to be an ally of 
Germany. Moreover, the newspapers employed techniques of juxtaposition that often focused 
more on Germany than Japan, often reducing Japan to merely a convenient example to 
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promote the ideology of the individual papers. Through a dogmatic interpretation of news 
events, the papers further narrowed their vision so that each saw a Japan that it wanted to see. 
In view of these impressions one must conclude that the later rapprochement and still 
later alliance between Germany and Japan resulted from contingent factors other than the 
structurally predetermined tendency suggested by previous interpretive frameworks. Some 
Germans and Japanese must have developed more favorable views of the other country 
between 1933 and 1936. One finds it remarkable that a potential deathblow to any Japanese-
German friendship, namely Nazi racism against all non-Aryans, hardly registered in the 
Japanese press outside a strictly anti-Semitic context. Instead, Nazi commentary on the Sino-
Japanese conflict remained largely neutral and free of racism, while Japanese newspapers 
found American discrimination of Japanese far more offensive than Nazi Aryanism. In 
addition, Hitler’s emphasis on the conquest of Lebensraum over the recovery of colonies 
removed the Pacific islands as a potential roadblock. Indeed, in 1933 none of the German 
newspapers surveyed devoted any article to the islands. Moreover, Germany and Japan 
shared deep resentment toward the League of Nations as an enforcer of the Diktat, obstacle to 
one’s legitimate territorial ambitions or an instrument of Anglo-French encirclement. Lastly, 
the activeness of the domestic communist movements in both countries as indicated by their 
newspapers’ increasing sophistication and popularity, and the boastful clout of the 
Communist International must have made the Soviet threat loom large over Japan’s and 
Germany’s horizons. 
In addition, as the Japanese government and Nazi regime applied stricter censorship 
to the media and thus deprived themselves of feedback and criticism from society, political 
and military leaders might well have lured themselves into an information filtering process 
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by interpreting what the free press saw as the other nation’s negative features as positive and 
admirable. In Germany, some Nazis might have already been imagining a common front with 
Japan since the Manchurian Incident in September 1931: 
It is war in the East. Not just the eternal, familiar civil war among the Chinese, 
but instead open war as the solution in the struggle for living spaces… The 
“Far East” is showing old Europe once again how wars are waged. Japan is 
held back by as little scruple now as in 1904, when it opened hostility against 
Russia by sinking three Russian warships in Port Arthur without a prior 
declaration of war. Needless to say, nowadays Japan cares little for the pretty 
statutes of the League of Nations.261 
While in Japan, an irrational paranoia about the spread and infiltration of communism drove 
some also to imagine a common front with Germany. As the government-subsidized Japan 
Times had it: 
 In Japan as in Germany, there are the forces of nationalism on the one hand 
And on the other those of communism – the latter to a very less degree to be 
sure, yet still manifested, if not politically, at least in police activities. Hence 
it is with close attention that Japan witnesses the conflict of these divergent 
forces in Germany.262 
It must have been this Nazi admiration of Japanese unscrupulousness and Japanese 
obsession with communism that propelled the two distant nations to cross paths. That the 
first act of collaboration between militarist Japan and Nazi Germany emerged as the Anti-
Comintern Pact should therefore surprise no one.
 
261 „Es ist Krieg im Osten. Nicht nur der ewige, beinahe schon zur Gewohnheit gewordene Bürgerkrieg 
des chinesischen Durcheinanders, sondern offener Krieg als Mittel zur Machtlösung im Kampf um 
Lebensräume… Der ,Ferne Osten’ hat dem alten Europe wieder einmal gezeigt, wie Kriege gemacht werden. 
Skrupel kennt Japan in solchen Dingen heute so wenig wie 1904, als die Feindseligkeiten gegen Rußland ohne 
vorherige Ankündigung durch die Versenkung dreier Kriegsschiffe im Hafen von Port Arthur eröffnet wurden. 
Selbstverständlich kümmert sich Japan auch heute nicht um die schönen Satzungen des Völkerbundes,“ in 
“Neue Kämpfe in der Mandschurei. Der Völkerbund soll helfen?” (New battles in Manchuria. Should the 
League of Nations help?), VB, 23 September 1931. 
 
262 “Germany supports parliamentarism,” Japan Times, 10 March 1933, p. 8. 
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